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ABSTRACT 
Reviewing previous literatures, w e found that the opinions on the value effect of 
diversification in emerging markets are virtually mixing, either value reducing or value 
enhancing. Using the data of fifty-one non-financial red-chips firms during the period 
from year 1992 to year 1998，we investigate the value effect of corporate diversification 
in Hong Kong capital market. Two methodologies are used in the thesis. 
First is developed by Fama, E., and K. French (1999). W e use this method to estimate 
the internal rates of return earned on the initial market value of their securities and the 
cost of their investments. The return on value (IRRv) is an estimate of the overall 
corporate cost of capital. The return on cost (IRRc) is the return delivered by the 
corporate sectors. For the years between 1992 -1998, the return on value is negative ten 
percent while the return on cost is positive, seven percent. So the result shows that the 
corporate investment is value-adding on average. W e also analyze the corporate 
structure and the interaction of corporate earnings, investment and financing decisions, 
which are important factors that influence the efficiency of investment and diversification 
effect. 
From another point of view, w e investigate the correlation between diversification and 
the stock returns of red chips by running a multivariate cross sectional regression. W e 
document that stock returns of individual red chip companies are highly correlated with 
the Hong Kong stock market. The average stock return of the whole red chip portfolio 
has significant influence on the stock return of entities in the portfolio. W e identify the 
good operating performance as the main source of stock return. Although diversification 
does bring additional stock return, its wealth effect is not significant. 
In addition, a thorough case study on GITIC's (Guangdong Investment and Trust Corp.) 
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Section One: Introduction 
Both 1950s and 1960s witness the dramatic diversification^  of U S firms. In late 1960s, 
U S firms' diversification reached its climax. However, the trend reversed since late 
1970s. Since late 1970s, U.S firms have been decreasing the level of diversification and 
this momentum was「emained throughout 1980s and 1990s.2 
Theoretically, diversification can be value-enhancing or value-reducing, subject to the 
comparison between benefits and costs that the diversification brings with. The potential 
benefits of diversification (operating different lines of business within one firm) include 
greater operation efficiency and flexibility, less incentive to forego positive net-present-
value projects, greater debt capacity and lower taxes. The potential costs of 
diversification include the use of increased discretionary resources to undertake value-
decreasing investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain resources 
from better-performing segments, and misalignment of incentives between central and 
divisional managers. 
Empirical studies provided mixed evidence on the value effect of diversification. In the 
developed markets (UK, Germany, Japan, and US), where financial markets function 
rather maturely, corporate diversification is documented to be value reducing, (see Lang 
and Stuize (1994)，Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996)，and Lins and Servaes 
‘Divers i f ica t ion means to operate di f ferent l ines of business within one f i rm. 
2 A number of empirical studies have documented the changes. The work by C o m m e n t and Jarrell (1994) and Liebeskind and Opler 
(1993) document a push toward specialization. A study by Morck，Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) provided evidence consistent with the 
attitude changes about diversif ication during the 1970s and 1980s. A related study by Matsusaka (1993) found that the stock price of 
conglomerates responded positively in the 1960s when they announced acquisi t ions, but responded negat ively to similar 
announcements in the 1980s. Servaes (1996) determined that the marke t ' s attitude toward diversif icat ion changes over t ime. In 
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(1999)). This suggests that the costs associated with diversification outweighed the 
benefits for those firms operating in the developed capital markets. However in emerging 
markets where market imperfection is much more severe, the related cost and benefits 
are not of the same magnitude. For example, the work by Khanna and Palepu (1997 and 
1998), which concentrated only on the Indian industry groups, provided empirical 
evidence on the value-enhancing effect of diversification. 
In our thesis, w e will focus on the red chip companies in the Hong Kong capital market 
and study the value effect of diversification in these companies. Red chip companies are 
companies that register in Hong Kong or overseas and represent the provincial 
governments or various branches of central government of People's Republic of China 
(China). Thus red chip companies, as its nature, raise capitals from the Hong Kong 
capital market and then allocate these capitals through the internal market to various 
projects within China. 
Many of these red chip companies were established in 1960s and 1970s when Mainland 
China was largely closed to the outside world. By virtue of its unique position and 
historical links, Hong Kong became an obvious window and a springboard for 
international investment to land in China. In early 1980s, the number of Hong Kong-
based red chip firms multiplied very rapidly as many started to diversify from trading to 
other sectors, involving in everything from trading, manufacturing, and tourism, to 
financial services, securities, real estate and transportation. 
contrast with the earlier f ind ings of diversif icat ion deiscounts in the 1980s，Servaes found no s ignif icant valuat ion penal ty associated 
with diversif icat ion in the 1970s. However , he did f ind s ignif icant divers i f icat ion penalt ies in the 1960s，as well as in the 1980s. 
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The wave of red chips was actually initiated by the listing of Hai Hong Holdings Co.Ltd 
with a phenomenal over-subscription in July 1992 and gradually reached its peak in 
1997. The fact is in 1996 and 1997 most red chip companies boosted their asset base 
very aggressively. After initial public offerings (IPOs), red chip companies collected a 
huge sum of new capital, and with a strong stock market, either through equity financing 
or debt financing, red chip companies easily got all the funds needed for further 
acquisition of assets. Therefore red chip companies abounded with capitals during this 
period of time. With a promising external economic environment and an internal 
motivation to develop as diversified conglomerate groups, red chip companies utilized 
these capitals to amass many state-owned enterprises (S〇E) assets in different sectors. 
However, in term of the funds in hand, attractive investment projects in the respective 
regions or business areas are somewhat limited because the segments of red chip 
conglomerates are either local-market based or insignificant players in China. So many 
red chip companies ventured into the areas that they are not very familiar with. 
W e observed that the role of red chips began to shake after the return of Hong Kong's 
sovereignty to People's Republic of China in 1997. In the first half of 1997，many red 
chip companies were rumored to start transferring funds for salaries and production 
purposes and so-called "stir-fried" in the Hong Kong stock market, propelling prices of 
red chips to unsustainable levels. Such kind of speculative activities contributed a lot to 
Hong Kong 's economic bubble, which is believed to be detrimental to Hong Kong's 
economic health. The following notorious Asia financial turmoil not only retarded the 
progress of the red-chips but also imposed liquidity stress on these companies. Then the 
failure of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC) and 
Guangdong Enterprise (GDE) literally announced that the end of honeymoon for red 
o 
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chips. All these events directly incited Beijing authorities to reconsider the role of red 
chips, especially while the return of Hong Kong also urged the government to take steps 
to fasten China's integration into the international economic community. 
W e concluded that in the past red chips have made great contributions to the economic 
development of China. The structure of red chips provides a unique way for many 
otherwise unqualified Chinese companies, due to different accounting standards and 
corporate governance structures, to raise capital through a window company from 
international capital market. But at the same time, agency and asymmetric information 
problems within these companies' diversified organizations gave rise to the problems of 
over-investment and corruption. Before the Asian financial crisis, diversified structure as 
that of ChaeboP' in South Korea, was once viewed by many as a preferred choice for the 
red chip companies in Hong Kong. Unfortunately the Asian financial crisis broke the 
success myth of Chaebol. Diversification was held in serious question. The collapse of 
GITIC and the restructuring of G D E raised the concern of streamlining corporate 
strategies, especially of refocusing on comparative advantage and disposing non-co「e 
operations. 
The defaults of GITIC and G D E triggered our interests to investigate red chips as a 
whole. W e believe the unique features of red chips and the specific environment of 
China economy provide a good opportunity to study the roles of external and internal 
capital markets and the dynamic process of the interactions between these two markets. 
‘ C h a e b o l is the industry gro叩 ings in South Korea. In many ways. Chaebol is quite similar to Keiretsu. the industry groupings in 
Japan. Both Chaebol and Keiretsu are characterized by diversified business, heavy cross holding or/ and concentrated f a m i l / 
ownership. One ot the mam differences between these two is the bank centered grouping for Keiretsu and centrally coordinated 
structure for Chaebol. 
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As known to all, China is now undergoing the transition from the centrally planed 
economy to market economy. In the era of planned economy, there existed no external 
capital market and capital was allocated entirely through an internal mechanism. A large 
gap between demand and supply of fund could not be fulfilled. At that time, red chips, to 
a large extent, satisfied the thirst for funds. With the process of reform in China, external 
capital market was established and started to play an important role in capital allocation. 
Raising capitals through red chips is no longer the only choice for companies in China. 
However, China has not opened its capital market to foreign investors yet. So in the near 
future, the potential international institutional investors still have to access China's 
enterprises through these red chip companies in Hong Kong. 
Moreover, in China the stated owned enterprises (SOE) play the most significant role in 
the market economy. The reform of S O E s is the key for the success of the China's 
economic reform. Red chips are actually SOEs. Thus the problems, the solutions and 
the future of red chip companies directly reflect those of S O E s as a mirror. By analyzing 
the structure and problems of red-chips, w e can figure out what could be the next stage 
for S O E s in general. 
Therefore we believe it is not only interesting but also meaningful to make a detailed 
investigation of the red chips. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related 
literatures. Section three describes a clinic study of the bankruptcy of a red chip 
company. Section four conducts a general analysis to investigate the return delivered by 
corporate investments and the corporate cost of capital, using the methodology 
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developed by Fama and French (1999). Section five analyses the wealth effect of 
diversification by studying the correlation between stock returns and degree of 
diversification. The last section gives out our conclusion. 
Section Two: Literature Review 
Theoretically, diversification can be both value-enhancing and value-reducing. The late 
1960s and early 1970s is the peak time of diversification. Theoretical work during this 
period of time is consistent with the trend of diversification activity and addresses the 
benefits of diversification. However most recent papers started to address the costs of 
diversification. 
1. Benefit of diversification 
1.1 The internal capital market hypotheses: 
(1) Internal capital market versus external capital market 
A central goal of research in corporate finance is to study the process by which 
capita丨 is allocated to the corporate sectors. In most work, the focus is on the 
external capital providers of the firm, for example, the bond market, the stock market, 
banks and finance companies. In principle, many of internal capital market 
transactions can take place in external markets. Business units of a conglomerate 
can either raise capital directly from the external capital markets or get funds 
allocated from the corporate headquarters. However as a matter of fact, an important 
part of the capital allocation process takes place in internal markets through which 
corporate headquarters allocate capital to its business units. 
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Internal capital market, in some ways, is like bank lending in some ways. Both of 
them represent centralized forms of financing, however the former is owner-provided, 
but the latter is not. In an internal capital market, corporate headquarters is the 
capital supplier and owns the business units to which it allocates capital. Corporate 
headquarters has the residual control rights of the use of the firm's assets. Giving 
residual control rights to the capital supplier has three important consequences: it 
leads to more monitoring and better asset redeployability than bank lending; but it 
reduces managers' entrepreneurial incentives on the other hand. 
(2) Literature related to Internal capital market hypotheses 
Alchian (1969) and Williamson (1975) suggested that internal capital market shield 
investment projects from the information and incentive problems that plague external 
finance. Weston (1970) argued that internal capital market is more efficient in 
resource allocation than is the external capital market. So diversified firms allocate 
resources more efficiently because they have a larger internal capital market. 
Stuize (1990) developed the above arguments. He said that by creating a larger 
internal capital market, diversified firms bypass the external capital market and make 
more positive net present value investments. Diversification allows the divisions with 
poor investment opportunities but high cash flows to finance the divisions with 
excellent investment opportunities however lack of capitals. The problem of under-
investment is reduced.^ 
4 The crux of the above arguments is that headquar ters does a good j o b of moni tor ing and informat ion product ion. In other 
words，the benef i t s that attributes to an internal c叩 i tal market may s imply be benef i t s of central ized finance, benef i t s that 
could be realized in an external market by raising capital f r om a central ized source. 
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1.2 The market imperfection hypotheses 
The market imperfection hypotheses argue that information asymmetries increase 
the cost of external funds over internal funds. (Williamson (1975)). W h e n information 
gaps are severe, the price differential between internal and external finances 
increases, which should make diversification more beneficial. (Stuize (1997)) 
1.3 Goinsurance effect 
Another benefit of diversification is the coinsurance effect rising from the imperfectly 
correlated earning streams. Lewellen (1971) pointed out that coinsurance effect 
increases firms' debt capacity. Increased debt capacity creates value by increasing 
interest tax shields. Thus, diversified firms are predicted to have lower tax payments 
than their businesses would show if operated separately. 
1.4 Tax Motivation 
A further tax advantage of diversification comes from the asymmetric treatment of 
gains and losses in tax. Majd and Myers (1987) predict that because of the carryback 
and carryforward provisions in tax codes, a conglomerate pays less tax than its 
segments would pay separately, as long as one or more segments of a 
conglomerate experience losses. 
1.5 Benefit from Relate Diversification 
Business unit managers inside related conglomerates would be more likely to be 
replaced in an internal shake-up following poor performance than either (1) top 
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managers of comparable stand-alone firms or (2) business-unit managers inside 
unrelated conglomerates. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1986) studied 58 business units in eight large corporations. 
They found a weak negative correlation between managerial tenure at the business-
unit level and the degree to which the business unit is related to others in the 
company. This finding suggests that there is higher managerial turnover in the 
business units of related conglomerates than in the business units of unrelated 
conglomerates. In addition, in their survey, the managers of related business units 
express lower job satisfaction than those of unrelated business units. Similarly 
Kaplan and Wisbach (1992) presented evidence that conglomerates are four times 
more likely to sell off their unrelated acquisitions than their related acquisitions. The 
above evidence implies that firms can simply replace managers of poorly performing 
related lines of business rather than selling the assets of those units. Thus related 
conglomerates business-unit managers have less bargaining power and are less 
able to extract rents. The agent cost is partly reduced. 
Moreover, business units of related diversified firms can share skills and resources 
used in related markets (Rumelt (1974)). The effect of reputation and economies of 
scope lower the joint cost of producing two more outputs (Nayyar (1993)). 
2 Costs of Diversification 
2.1 Agency Problem at the level of capital provider 
W h e n we discuss the benefit of internal capital allocation, we assume that the 
corporate headquarters that funds the agent-prone projects is itself profit-maximizer 
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and free of any sort of credit constraints. However, if there are agency problems at 
the level of the capital provider, w e do not know whether these problems are 
somehow exacerbated in an internal market. Is headquarters more inclined to make 
inefficient investments than is an external capital provider (for example, a bank 
lender)? Suppose that monitoring involves actual on-site visits by the investor's 
agents, where they interact with the business-unit managers. The more monitoring, 
the more interaction, and the more possible is for business-unit managers to engage 
in influence activities. In other words, headquarters staff will be in closer contact with 
business-unit managers than would be bank loan officers. Hence they are more likely 
to be wined and dined and ultimately won over by managers. This may make it 
harder for headquarters staff to perform a useful disciplinary role. 
Market imperfection also increases the potential agency costs of diversification. 
Higher degree of asymmetric information, weak regulation and poor accounting 
standards may allow management and large shareholders to more easily exploit the 
firm for their own purposes. Jensen (1986) asserted that the managers of the 
diversified firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more 
likely to undertake value-decreasing investments. To the extent that lines of business 
have access to more free cash flow as part of a diversified firm than on their own, 
Jensen predicted that diversified firms invest more in negative net present value 
projects than their segments would if operated independently. Stuize (1990) also 
argued that diversified firms would invest too much in lines of business with poor 
investment opportunities. 
2.2 Credit Constraints 
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If there exits a closed parent/subsidiary credit link, when one business unit of a 
conglomerate experiences a very bad year, it is likely to cause the conglomerate as 
a whole to be pinched for cash, and vice versa. The incentive of a weak parent will 
result in passing burden to the subsidiary with additional liabilities. And it is possible 
that parent company's bankruptcy may force the bankruptcy of its subsidiaries. 
Liquidity problems somehow will spill over from one business unit to another.^ 
2.3 Decreased entrepreneurial incentives 
Giving residual control rights to capital providers through an internal capital allocation 
process is costly because it diminishes managerial incentives. Managers do not have 
control rights. He or she is more vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by corporate 
headquarters. Thus the manager may not get all of the rents from his efforts, which 
reduces his incentives. 
2.4 Information asymmetry Cost 
Diversified firms have the cost of information dispersion. Information asymmetry cost 
arises between the headquarters and divisions managers. Myerson (1982) and 
Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) found that these costs are higher in conglomerates 
than in focused firms to the extent information is more dispersed within diversified 
firms, leading to the prediction that diversified firms are less profitable than their lines 
of business would be separately. 
2.5 Cross-subsidies Effect 
2. The empirical work by Lamount (1997) suggests that such intrafirm liquidity spillovers do indeed take place. He found that when 
oil companies, profit were hurt by the drop in oil prices in 1986. they cut investment not only in their oil-related divisions but also in 
their nonoil-related divisions. 
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Cross subsidization allows poor segments to drain resources from better-performing 
segments. Since a failing business can not have a value below zero if operated on its 
own, but can have a negative value if it is a part of a conglomerate that provides 
cross-subsidies. Hence unprofitable lines of business create greater value losses in 
conglomerates than they would as stand-alone firms. (Meyer, Milgrom, and Robert 
(1992)) 
O n the value effect of diversification, a number of empirical studies have been published. 
These studies can be classified into three types. The first type analyzes stock price 
changes and stock returns. The second type of study looks more specifically at whether 
diversified firms are either more or less valuable than less focused firms. The third type 
of study examines accounting data to determine the change in the profitability.® 
1. Stock Returns and Stock Price changes 
Copeland and Weston (1979) cited several studies that found superior stock price 
performance by conglomerates over mutual funds in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
However, other studies found inferior performance during this period. Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1987) argued that the performance of a sample of conglomerates 
becomes noticeably worse if the 1970s are included. De (1992) however found no 
cross-sectional correlation between the degree of focus and measures of excess 
return calculated over the period 1976-1985. 
2. Accounting Studies 
6 The following discussion draws heavily on Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy by Mark Grinblatt and Sheridan Titman 
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Because stock price reactions reflect the information conveyed by an offer, it is 
difficult to use stock returns to draw inferences about the value effect of 
diversification. For this reason, some researchers examined accounting data to draw 
inferences about the underlying economic impact of diversification. Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt (1991) reviewed the literatures measuring performance with accounting 
numbers and found that no consensus emerges. 
3. Specific Empirical Evidence on the Gains/Loss to Diversification 
Lang and Stuiz (1994) found that the market places lower values on more diversified 
firms. They presented a negative relation between Tobin's q-ratio? and several 
diversification measures, including the number of segments reported by 
management and revenue- and asset-based Herfindahl indexes®. 
Similarly，Berger and Ofek (1995) documented a significant loss of value in 
diversified corporations over the 1986-1991 sample period. They pointed out that 
over-investment and subsidization are two main sources of value loss. If both of the 
two are well controlled, diversification strategy can create small benefits in the 
names of increasing tax shields and debt capacity. 
Comment and Jarrell (1995), who examined changes in diversification during 1978-
1989, found that firms destroy value when they diversify and create value when they 
sell divisions and become more focused. Servaes (1996) determined that the 
market's attitude toward diversification changes over time. He found no significant 
7 Tobin ' s q is the ratio of the market value of the stock to the replacement value of the f i rm 's assets, which can be viewed as a measure 
f f managerial performance. Well-performed firms have a high Tob in ' s q value; poorly managed firms have a low Tob in ' s q 
f ^ ^ - ^ b ^ Z s s ^ ^ ^ ^ and revenue-based. It reflects the degree to which revenue/or assets are c o n c e n . L d I , . s t a 
I 
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valuation penalty associated with diversification in the 1970s. However, Servaes did 
not find significant diversification penalties in the 1960s, as well as 1980s. 
Obviously these researches have one thing in common: they all focus on the developed 
capital markets. Most recent evidence from the developed markets (the UK, Germany, 
Japan, and US) indicates that corporate diversification is value reducing, (see Lang and 
Stuize (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Lins and Servaes (1999)). 
These researches reasoned that because the financial markets in developed countries 
functioned well enough to allocate capital efficiently, the costs related to diversification 
have outweighed the benefits for the average firms operating in the developed capital 
markets. 
However, in emerging markets^ the evidences are mixing. 
Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1998) studied the performance of diversified Indian business 
groups. They argued that diversification can be of value in emerging markets because 
diversified firms can mimic the beneficial functions of various institutions which are 
present in developed markets. The imperfections of capital markets, contract 
enforcement, business-government relations, product markets, and labor markets make 
it more difficult for focused firms to survive. 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1998) studied the profitability and valuation of 
diversified firms in nine East Asian countries in 1991-1996. They found the positive 
relation between per-capital G N P and the valuation effects of both vertical integration 
and related diversification. 
9 The classification of emerging markets is based on the list compiled by the International Monetary Fund and the Economist 
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In contrast to the above positive evidence, Karl and Servas (1999) gave little support to 
the value-adding effect of diversification. They examined the value of diversification in 
seven emerging markets^® and found that there is a diversification discount at the firm 
level in six of the seven countries in their sample. The results of their study surprisingly 
are consistent with the evidence found for the developed capital market that the agency 
cost of diversification outweighs the potential benefits. 
Section Three: A Clinic study of the Guangdong International Trust and 
Investment Corporation 
1998 is a dark year for foreign investors in China. O n Oct. 26, 1998, Beijing authorities 
abruptly shut down the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Gorporation 
(GITIC). And at the same time, Beijing authorities announced that China's government 
would not be responsible for the repayment of all the debts of failing GITIC. As the result, 
the bankruptcy of GITIC relentlessly shattered the long-time rosy perception of foreign 
investors that there is an implicit sovereign guarantee from China's government to 
extend credits to Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The bankruptcy also raised 
the serious concern about the effect of diversification in China's industry. Is 
diversification a good way of adding value? Can diversified firms outperform their 
segments if they operate separately? Should China's industry follow the steps of 
The seven emerg ing markets are Hong Kong. India，Indonesia’ Malays ia . S ingapore . South Korea，and Thai land . 
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Keiretsu in Japan and Chaebol in South Korea" which were once assumed to be the 
good examples for China's industry? 
I. Back ground ofGITIC 
GITIC was established in 1980 by the provincial government of Guangdong. It was one 
of the ten original windows designated by China's central government that could secure 
foreign borrowings. And it was the only such institution in the Guangdong province. 
GITIC was incorporated in Bermuda on June”，1996. O n March 11, 1997 GITIC 
became the holding company of the Group and was listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong with glamorous seven hundred times over subscription. 
GITIG is owned and controlled by the Guangdong provincial government and operated 
under the supervision of the People's Bank of China. It is the premier investment vehicle 
of the Guangdong province. GITIC's main task is to raise funds in both foreign and 
domestic capital markets in support of the economic development of Guangdong 
province. During the past seventeen years, GITIC Group has developed from a financial 
and investment institution into a diversified conglomerate having a wide spectrum of 
business activities, including project financing, direct investment, real estate 
development, hotel investment, securities dealing and investment, import and export 
trading and overseas businesses. In 1994, GITIC was ranked as the fourth largest 
enterprise in the trust and investment industry (in terms of total assets) in China. O n 
December31, 1995’ the audited consolidated total assets of the GITIC Group were 
” K e i r e t s u and Chaebol are big industry groups. They are characterized by diversified business, heavy cross holdings, or/and 
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approximately R M B 20,563 million. W h e n GITIC declared bankruptcy in January 1998, it 
had 240 firms under umbrella, with assets of $2.5 billion against debts of $4.3 billion.^ ^ 
GITIC had developed seven core businesses: international operation, leasing, trading, 
real estate development, equity investment, securities and brokerage and financial 
services” 
1. Securities and Brokerage: 
GITIC Shenzhen Corporation was the subsidiary of GITIC. It conducted the 
securities business and behaved as an important player in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. GITIC was very active in forming investment trusts. It mostly cooperated 
with foreign investment banks. During the cooperation, the foreign partners made the 
selection while GITIC was mainly responsible for bringing in deals. 
2. Financial Services: 
The financial services business included the provision of guarantees and short-term 
and long-term lending in both local and foreign currencies. The business was 
conducted by the International Finance department of GITIC, the subsidiaries in 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong and its N e w York affiliate, N e w York Guangdong Finance 
Inc. International Finance department is the largest business line of GITIC group. It is 
also a major foreign currency-funding source for the other business lines within the 
concentrated family ownership. Keiretsu is mainly bank-center-grouped. But Chaebol has centrally coordinated structure. 
Data f rom the Hong Kong Economic Daily 
The following discussion draws heavily on "Fallout of the GITIC Default" . November 1998. M o o d y ' s Bank and Sovereign Credit 
Vw v/11111IC11 Lo. 
17 
group. Loans by GITIC must go to the projects within the Guangdong Development 
Plan. 
3. Equity investment: 
GITIC group had made over two hundred investments in energy, transportation, 
cement manufacturing, and other industries. Investments were approved by GITIC 
based on both the social benefits and the commercial feasibility of the projects. 
Sometimes, the investments were made as part of the financial package for new 
projects. 
4. International operation: 
GITIC has subsidiaries and affiliated companies in Hong Kong, Macau, Australia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and US. Most of them were involved in finance, trading and real 
estate. The overseas companies served as a contract to support other business 
operation of GITIC. 
5. Leasing: 
GITIC wholly owned subsidiary, Guangdong International Leasing Corporation, is 
mainly responsible for the leasing business of GITIC. 
6. Trading: 
GITIC engaged in both domestic and international trade. As a part of a conglomerate, 
GITIG's trading operation had closed ties with suppliers that were financed or 
invested by GITIC. The trading operation had financial support from the group's 
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financial business and it could open letters of credit directly. Cement sales once 
dominated the trading revenue of the entire group. 
7. Real estate development: 
Guangdong Trust and Real Estate Development Corporation did the real estate 
business of GITIC. It is wholly owned by the GITIC and was the largest real estate 
developer in the south China. The business included hotels, offices and residential 
housing. 
II. Factors behind the failure of GITIC: 
After the failure of GITIC, investors and analysts gave out all kinds of speculations 
and explanations, trying to elaborate the reasons behind the failure. After digesting 
all the information on our hands about GITIC, w e believe the following internal and 
external reasons causally lead to the failure of GITIC. 
1. Internal factors: 
1.1 Management strategy and control; 
As the designated window of China and prime investment arm of Guangdong 
province, GITIC took the strategy that interacts closely with the national and regional 
development plans. Its long-term business development was subject to the approval 
of the Guangdong provincial government. Its major investments and lending 
decisions were generally included in either Guangdong government's or the State 
economic development plans. GITIC's business concentration reflected the 
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Guangdong government's economic development priorities. Therefore it is very hard 
for GITIC to fulfill its pure business role. 
The political nexus means that it has not necessarily been profit-driven entity, but 
instead often is subject to the whim of politicians with even ill conceived and 
speculative pet projects. So the agency cost is prohibitively expensive. Since the 
government is assumed to be the backup and it is the government who in fact 
determines where these collected capitals should go, few will care about whether 
these projects are profitable and reasonable. 
GITIC operated under the control of the Guangdong provincial government，and 
reported directly to it. Besides under the control of the Guangdong government, 
GITIC was also under the supervision of China's central bank, the People's Bank of 
China (PBOC). GITIC's external borrowings were regulated by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). However, due to its powerful sponsor, 
the regulation of the central bank and S A F E is very weak. For example, some 50 
percent of GITIC's total foreign debt of $950 millions was not registered with foreign 
exchange regulators in Beijing. Of that figure, $419 million in gloating-rate 
commercial notes was sold illegally overseasi4. 
1.2 Management quality and transparency 
GITIC's main managers are assigned by the Guangdong government. Most of them 
have only lengthy careers within the provincial government. These officials are 
anything but business professionals. Management was out of control. For instance: 
Data source: Datastream 
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1) GITIC lent money to its subsidiaries, but no one cared if these subsidiaries 
acknowledged the debt and no one knew if it really received the money. Take 
GITIC's long term lending to its subsidiaries for example, less than a third of 6.87 
billion R M B in outstanding lending is expected to be recovered/ 
2) GITIC failed to conduct diligent investigation and evaluation on the background of 
debtors during the process of approval. 
3) There was no system to monitor the repayment of loans and to pursue recovery of 
the amount outstanding. W h e n a debtor failed to repay the amount outstanding， 
GITIC's usual practice was either to extend the term of the loans or to capitalize the 
long overdue interest. Such behavior was especially incriminating in GITIC's 丨ending 
to manufacturing enterprises, which comprised 61 percent of the company's loan 
portfolio. According to the liquidation committee's finding, 196 billion R M B in 
manufacturing investment were made with companies that had now cease 
operations. An additional 3.41 billion R M B in investment has been placed with 
companies in difficulty. 
4) GITIC's investment in more than 30 local property companies also was problematic. 
For example, the company invested 1.1 billion R M B in subsidiary Guangdong Real 
Estate (Holdings), whose principal assets consisted of properties where construction 
has now been suspended. 
All the above problems were not disclosed until the collapse of GITIC, because GITIC 
has never operated in the clearest light of day. For example, GITIC claimed to have 
ownership in 132 foreign and domestic companies, but its debt-clearance committee 
* source： Datastream 
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I. 
found interest in 240 firms. Due to lack of transparency, the monitoring by investors is 
very ineffective. 
1.3 Blind assets expansion 
GITIC moved into too many areas. It involved in everything, but did nothing well. It 
took places in banking, financing, trading, real estate development, and tourism in 
Hong Kong and China. But none of them is its core business. And its main business 
areas have no close relationship. So GITIC may not enjoy the benefit of the related 
diversification.15 From the following table one and figure one, w e can see the R O A 
(Return on Assets) of GITIC from 1996 to 1998 could never catch up with the G R O A 
(Growth Rate on Assets), which means most of GITIC's investment in the three 
years turned out unproductive. 
Table One: Comparison of GITIC's G R O A and R O A 
W H I B B H I I H I B I B H I I I H 
Growth rate on Assets(GROA) 22.31% 103,01 % 
Return on Assets{ROA) 11.42% 17.23% -29.73% 
Source: Bloomberg 
* source： Hong Kong Economic Daily 
1 �M a n y researchers point out that related diversified firms perform better than conglomerates. For instance. Rumelt (1974) argues 
that related diversification affects value more positively than unrelated diversification because skills and resources can be used in 
related markets. Nayyar (1993) suggests that benefits from a positive reputation in an existing business and from economies of scope 
are available from related, but not from unrelated diversification. Others discuss the effects of reputation and economies of scope, 
which arise when the joint cost of producing two or more outputs is less than the sum of the costs of producing each output by itself. 
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Figure One: G R O A and R O A Comparison 
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Data source: Bloomberg 
1.4 Moving into riskier activities: 
GITIC reduced its traditional 丨ending and investment activities and increased its 
exposure to property development and stock brokerage. According to the company 
source，it has lost nearly $1.3 billion in the past years by playing alone in the risky 
property and future market in Hong Kong. 
1.5 W e a k Risk management 
In addition to moving into riskier activities, GITIC increased its off-balance-sheet 
exposu「ei6, mostly in the form of loan guarantees. It is a typical example of loose risk 
management. 
GITIC had heavy reliance on the foreign funds. Foreign investors own one third of its 
$4.3 billion debts. However, it had no appropriate hedge strategy. The heavy reliance 
丨6 Off-balance sheet activities involve the creation of contingent assets and liabilities. Off-balance sheet activities include the letter of 
credit, loan commitments and the position in forward, futures, swaps, options and other derivative securities. These activities are 
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on foreign funds makes GITIC vulnerable to the shifts in the confidence of foreign 
creditors and to the currency risk^ .^ GITIC asserted that it engaged in derivative 
transactions to minimize foreign exchange risk, however, the lack of a developed 
currency forward and swap market put the effectiveness of the hedging activities in 
question. 
GITIC also displayed some penchant for funding long-term projects with short-term 
money. The mismatching exposed GITIC to the risk of high interest rate and the 
withdrawal of funds. In 1998’ under the stress of financial crisis, foreign lender banks 
tried to yank their China credit lines at once. They did not want to roll over GITIC's 
loans that would come to due. GITIC's interest burden was too heavy to shoulder. 
Take the interest coverage ratio^ ^ for example, in 1997’ the interest coverage ratio is 
16.63. However, it decreased to 一 18.73 in 1998. (See Table Two) 
1.6 Stretched liquidity and Rising Leverage^® 
With the following table two and table three and by the means of financial ratios, w e 
distinguish those comparatively stronger red chips from the problematic ones. The 
four companies in the upper section that had higher interest coverage and cash 
ratios and lower debt to equity ratios cold be deemed as good companies. For the 
remaining two companies in the lower section, as they all had much lower interest 
coverage and cash ratios are viewed ad problem companies. 
structured to reduce exposure to credit, interest rate, or foreign exchange risks. Mismanagement or inappropriate use of these 
interments can result in major losses. 
: C u r r e n c y risk is the risk that exchange rage changes can affect the value of assets and liabilities located abroad 
” T h e interest coverage ratio measures a f i rm ' s current ability to meet its interest payments. 
” R a t i o s themselves are not sufficient to understand the financial conditions of a red chip company. Apart f rom debt financing red 
chips could have equity financing as another option. Usually, it is red chips，parent companies rather than the listed red chips^hat have 
poor financial conditions with low liquidity ratios. Because debts have been their main source of funds. 
Leverage ratios in the table were diverse. 
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Table Two: Debt to Equity and Interest Coverage Ratios Comparison between 
GITIC and Some Major Red Chips 
D/E Interest D/E Interest D/E Interest 
coverage coverage coverage 
CITIC 0.27 33.7 0.55 9.17 0.5 3.69 
China Resource 0.28 8.14 0.35 11.22 0.32 7.55 
Shanghai Industrial 0.2 7.81 0.29 8.66 0.25 7.76 
COSCO 0.55 4.4 0.70 5.56 N/A N/A 
Guangdong Investment 0.44 4.54 0.68 3.73 0.82 -2.26 
GITIC 0.27 9.03 0.23 16.63 0.26 -18.73 
— i  
N/A: Not available 
Interest Coverage ratio = Earnings (before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) to interest payments 
Data source: Bloomberg 
Table Three: Current and Cash Ratios Comparison between GITIC and Some 
Major Red Chips 
Current Cash Current Cash Current Cash 
- 、、、 
ratio ratio ratio ratio ratio ratio 
y - :、 
0.78X 0,89 1.03X 1J3 1.02X 0.66 
入：、、、、、 、 . 
Ohins R-csourcc 
4.UX -0.28 3.7X 0.71 2.79Y 0 
.‘ �� ^ . � 
‘ — — * L t  
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Shanghai Industrial 2.11X r 0 6 " " " 4.00X f o ： ^ 4 . 0 4 X VOM""“ � � " � � � � � � 
、：，、.：、 � 1.58X 0*71 0.47X 0.38 N/A N/A � � - � - � - � � 、，、、‘、、、、 、 -  
Guangdong Investment 1.26X (M)4 1.02X 0.13 0.44X 0.07 
V � 
G m c 1.31X 0.02 1.83X 0.3 1.51X 0.04 
• • ~ -
~r� _ • , = 
N/A: Not available 
Cash ratio = Cash flow from operating activities/ Current liability 
Data source: Bloomberg 
2 External factors: 
2.1 Foreign investors: 
Foreign investors have been very generous to red chips and their parent companies 
since 1993. The positive credit stance of banks and international investors towards 
red chips, to a large extent, based on the following rationales: 
1. The robust economic growth and ‘‘ope门 door "policy of china since 1993 
bolstered the good expectation of creditors on China's prospect. Moreover, 
lending to an entity that entwined with government so tightly can build 
relationships and a positive image. Such good image can bring in a lot of benefits 
when China opens its domestic banking market to foreigners. 
2. Despite of being start-up enterprises without established track record, red chips 
were made up of diversified operations in their portfolios. They were viewed to 
have better corporate disclosure and more monitoring relative to other Chinese 
companies under the strict supervisions of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. In 
addition, the information provided by the audited financial statements has 
indicated financial condition to some extent. 
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3. A string of asset injection by parent companies at big discount had painted a 
picture of sustainable growth potential for red chips. Creditors and investors had 
taken it on faith that red chips would solicit a variety of assets from the respective 
government and would be freely delivered profitable deals in the mainland. 
4. O n the top of that, creditors were convinced that red chips were representing 
their respective governments to conduct operation. The funds raised were 
channeled into projects in the locality and industry supported by the governments. 
In addition, the respective government authorities in some case have 
demonstrated their support by providing guarantees, awareness and comfort 
letter to the banks in the financing transactions of red chips. 
The successful experience of foreign investors on those counterparts of red chips also 
reinforced the "no default" confidence of bankers to China credit. As a matter of fact, 
before the occurrence of GITIC's fallout, credit default of China-affiliated companies was 
rare. In the recent bankruptcy case of Chinese enterprises, such as Hainan 
Development Bank, the central government bailed out creditors to fully collect their loans 
in the end. To some extent, the credit risk of China-affiliated companies had been 
viewed to be at quasi-sovereign level. For example, in July 1997’ Moody assigned to 
China a foreign currency rating of A3 whereas, CITIC Pacific limited and Guangdong 
Enterprises Ltd. had a rating of BAA2 and BAAS respectively.^^ 
In this logic，creditors ignore the obvious facts about the regulatory, legal and 
fundamental economic limits on governmental resou「ces2i，particularly in highly 
"”The grading after A3 is B A A l . BAA2 and so on 
o u t n l ' ^ r r ' ' ^ r r " by Moody on April 1998 pointed out that the ITIC ' s gove 誦 ent owners were not in a strong position to bail 
ITICs and other corporations they controlled in case of a failure. The assumption by the local governments of t L ITICs 
would cost them between 20 percent to seventy-six percent of their respective yearly fiscal Revenue, which w^s of ^ L g h 
I 
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competitive market conditions. They are rather imprudent in making lending decisions. 
Foreign investors did not make a strict analysis of the balance sheets and the credit-
worthiness of the borrowers. They even do not ask for collateral as what they usually do 
elsewhere. 
However, provincial guaranties do not equal to sovereign debts. The guarantees offered 
by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the body that was in charge of 
registering loans, is not a genuine safeguard against default at any circumstances either. 
According to the lawyers, registering a loan with S A F E merely guarantees that when the 
time had to make due payments to overseas lenders, the foreign exchange would be 
made available. If there was no money to repatriate, then no guarantee existed. The 
easy coming money, which generates from the misunderstanding of foreign creditors, 
pushed GITIC to step further into risk. 
2.2 W e a k regulation of Non-bank financial institutions in China. 
Part of GITIC's failure is due to the lack of strong and effective supervision in time. 
People's Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank of China, is the regulator of 
mainland non-banking institutions. But its regulation is rather weak. Part of its 
function overlaps with that of C C S R C (China Security Regulation Commission). 
While sometimes, neither of them has direct supervision on certain areas, leaving a 
great black hole for losses. 
Currently，the central bank is still focus on the banks in China. The central bank has 
very weak regulation power over GITIC and those entities that boast powerful 
sponsors. For example, in late 1996, the central bank conducted an investigation of 
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570 non-bank financial institutions, which resulted in the close down of about 130 of 
them. However, many of the closed companies were only believed to lack the 
support of a powerful sponsor, and those that were well connected, despite their 
distressed financial conditions, were re-approved. The most public example of a 
powerful sponsor significantly impeded the regulation of the central bank was China 
Agribusiness Development Trust and Investment Corporation (CADTIC), a 门on_ 
financial institution under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture. To the 
embarrassment of the central bank and also as an indication of its real regulatory 
power, the central bank re-registered CADTIC after two months since the close down. 
In the absence of clear and strict regulations, GITIC and the other ITICs 
(International Trust and Investment Corporations) have diversified their investment 
beyond the financing of projects essential to the orderly development of local 
governments. 
2.3 Quality of the accounting data and accounting principles 
China's general accepted accounting principles are still in the early stage. 
Corporations compose financial statements in a rather free way. GITIC's financial 
statements were prepared in accordance with the Accounting Standard of 
Enterprises and the Finance Standard of Enterprises issued by the Ministry of 
Finance and other regulations determined by Guangdong's provincial finance bureau. 
Some accounting practices are misleading: 
1 • Consolidation results only reflected GITIC and its wholly owned domestic 
subsidiaries. Subsidiaries incorporated outside China and less than full-owned 
domestic subsidiaries were recorded as investments at cost. 
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2. Foreign currency items were converted to R M B using the fixed exchange rates 
approved by Guangdong Province Financial Bureau, which could be very 
different from the market rate，especially for those prior to the 1994 unification of 
exchange rates. 
3. No parent-only financial were disclosed. 
4. GITIC sometimes arbitrarily amortized the loan losses. 
5. The amount of guarantees and other contingent liabilities was not disclosed in 
the annual report 
Since there is no strict internal and outside auditing, accounting data provided are 
subject to manipulation and could not fully and accurately reflect financial position of 
the firm. So it is hard for investors to do horizontal and vertical analysis, no less than 
get a clear picture of the right position of an individual firm in the industry. 
A report on China's ITICs by the World Bank in 1997 gave out an appropriate 
summary of the chaotic accounting records: "Asset quality has not been accurately 
reflected in financial statements and is generally not even evaluated... annual reports 
are usually irregular reported... bad-debt reserves are not adequate... As a result, 
the true financial conditions of the ITICs cannot be determined by an analysis of 
financial statements." 
2.4 Stress from the Asian financial crisis. 
GITIC has about 240 major creditors, including 135 foreign institution dominated by 
Japanese and European banks. Its main creditors are located in Hong Kong, Japan 
and Thailand (see table four). 
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Table Four: GITIC's Top 10 Lender Banks 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank Japan 61.27 
Dresdner Bank Germany 60.75 
Bank of China Mainland 51.57 
Hang Seng Bank Hong Kong 51 
Sumitomo Bank Japan 49.67 
Bank of East Asia Hong Kong 44,75 
HSBC Hong Kong 42.77 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Japan 42.59 
Sakura Bank Japan 39.47 
Societe Generale France 39.09 
Source: Basisfield 
During the bull market run in 1996 and 1997, Hong Kong market was in a optimistic 
phase of the credit cycle, competitive pressure led to rapid expansion of lending and 
bid down of spreads. However, after the financial turmoil, market sentiment changed 
drastically and banks became reluctant to lend. Lending activities have reduced 
substantially and spreads have widened. According to Basis Point, the number of 
completed transactions in Hong Kong debt market reduced from 446 in 1997 to 160 
in June of 1999. 
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The weak economy after the financial crisis speeded the fund withdraws of Asian 
countries. Because of weakened currencies and credit troubles, many Asian 
companies have chosen to invest in their home countries rather than overseas. The 
financial crisis in Asia and Russia also put multinationals on alert for trouble signs in 
China. The whole Asia, Latin American, Russia crisis really set off a scare for 
business as they thought about risk exposure to China. 
Before Asian financial crisis, the attracting foreign money had been of high priority, 
therefore the regulatory authorities in the past were willing to turn a blind eye on 
some violations of external financing regulations by companies like GITIC. The Asian 
financial turmoil alerted the Chinese policymakers that excessive borrowing by highly 
leveraged companies was especially dangerous. The reckless borrowing activities by 
poorly managed companies such as GITIC could become a serious drain on the 
country's foreign exchanges reserves, which in the eyes of the authorities, were 
China's ultimate strength. In early 1998，in order to block the drainage of foreign 
exchange and defend the R M B , the Chinese government undertook a strict control 
on foreign exchange. This led to the difficulties of many red chips in remitting funds 
out of China, which further stretched their liquidity. From then on, banks have started 
to closely monitor the credit situation of Chinese-affiliated companies, including red 
chips. The credit crunch became wider. 
2.5 Concern of the government 
From the point of the government, it is a good time to claim the bankruptcy of GITIC 





In the past, the central government appointed a state commercial bank to clean up 
liabilities left over from failed financial institutions. China's wobbly state banks are 
already under the weight of about $200 billion in non-performing loans. The required 
bail out in turn perpetuates a moral hazard, encouraging risky lending and 
investment. These policy loans have left huge amount of bad debts on the book of 
banks, dragging the commercial process of banks. The closure of GITIC will be a 
good beginning of the reform of China's financial system. Beijing has announced the 
determination to push ahead with reforms to separate government functions from 
business. Such reforms call for the restructuring of many Hong Kong window 
companies. 
Moreover, under assured minimum return arrangement, the join-venture partner, 
typically a municipal government arm, will reach into its own coffers to pay the 
difference between a project's actual return and assured returns. Since the 
payment's value is usually denominated in H K or U S dollars, the government just 
does not like these arrangements because it is like quasi debt. This is a sensible 
topic in China, because China does not take up the floating rate system. After the 
financial crisis, government took up tighter control of foreign currency, especially 
these hard currencies. If local government had been allowed to pour into GITIC, 
Beijing's absolute control would be diminished. 
2.6 China's economy 
China's staggering economy increased the credit risk of GITIC. Credit risk is the risk 
that the promised payment from loans may not be paid in full. Majority of most of 
GITIC's borrowers' cost and revenues are in domestic currency. The economy 
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downturn and devaluation of R M B put the borrowers into a difficult situation to honor 
the obligations and would adversely affected GITIC's own debt-servicing ability. 
III. Negative influence 
Although the shut down of GITIC is a good beginning of the reform of the financial 
market，negative factors still inevitably cast shadow on China, both in economic and in 
political area. 
3.1 Economic area 
The decision to send GITIC into bankruptcy and the decreasing support from the central 
bank shakes confidence among foreign bankers and cools down their sentiment. The 
cooling sentiment is reflected in: 
1. The first quarter's figures for foreign investment dropped nearly fifteen percent to 
$7.34 billion in the first three months from the year-ago period. Contracted or 
promised investment reached $8.72 billion, little changed from the first quarter in 
1998. Many overseas businesses in China are leaving unprofitable ventures while 
others have turned suddenly cautious about financial risks in the country and the 
Asian region^^. 
2. Rating agencies such as S & P lowered their credit ratings on a series number of 
Chines banks. 
3. Hard currency lending to china falls sharply as a result many banks have traditionally 
「elied on the assumption that Beijing would bail out government firms if they run 
“ S o u r c e : Datastream 
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credit problems. The overseas capital raising by Mainland Chinese firms is slowed. 
For instance, China State Development Bank has postponed plans to float an 
overseas bond until the international market sentiment toward China is more 
favorable. 
4. The failure of GITIC may cause the indiscriminate credit squeeze on mainland firms. 
Basically, it is wrong to tar all these entities with the same brush and totally discount 
the government supports they could receive. But ever since GITIC closed, investors 
have been rushing out. Foreign lenders may not be disposed to roll over loans that 
come due for other ITICs. Banks will try to yank their China credit lines all at once, 
making the liquidity crunch ever worse. Souring sentiment has already been seen as 
a major cause for failed equity issues for two H-share listing candidates in 1999. 
Two Hong Kong subsidiaries of GITIC have been put under voluntary liquidation， 
while a listed arm, whose initial public offer in 1998 recorded 892 times subscribed, 
has had its share trading suspended. 
5. The stakes are even bigger for Hong Kong where bank loans equal about 140 
percent of gross domestic product, one of the highest levels in Asia. 
Bankers in Hong Kong worry that the default of GITIC may start a domino effect in 
which banks pull loans to other Chinese state owned companies in Hong Kong. 
According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, which acts as the region's central 
bank，Chinese controlled companies and their parents have much more than $1.4 
billion in debt coming due by the end of July 1999. That is equivalent to 9.7 percent 
of all loans by banks in Hong Kong. The vast amount of contingent losses will 
worsen the staggering banking of Hong Kong, which has been hard bit during the 
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financial crisis. Without active financial activities of kinds of banks, recovery of the 
economy in the near future is less probable, thus further shock people's confidence. 
Before and after the return of Hong Kong to China, china has promised to keep its 
prosperity. In the past, Hong Kong has successfully attracted quite a lot of capital 
that speeds up the reform process of China. However, The possible following 
turndowns may put additional pressure on Hong Kong. If Hong Kong loses its 
reputation as one of Asia's most active capital markets, it could be tougher and more 
costly to use the city to raise funds for China's heavily indebted state enterprises. 
The cancellations of three Initial Public Offerings have raised questions about Hong 
Kong's position as the premier fund-raising center for Chinese firms. Competition to 
host mainland listings has sharpened. London, N e w York, and closer home, 
Singapore which operates in the same time zone as Hong Kong and also enjoys the 
same language facility as the Chinese, will be more happy to have these companies 
list on their bourses. The message is clear to Hong Kong: it will have to work harder 
to convince international investors and listing candidates from China that it is still the 
place for mainland listings. But foreign investors and bankers often fail to distinguish 
between countries within a region and among different types of companies from the 
same country. So they will give similar treatment to these promising entities as they 
do to entities such as GITIC. So it is in the interest of China that Beijing authority 
clears the air soon. 
6. After the South East Asian Crisis, China seems to be the last standing country. For 
many times, China has promised not to devaluate its currency. Relative expensive 
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R M B makes it harder to compete with the other Asian countries. So stimulating 
domestic demands is considered to be an important, maybe the number one bailout 
for the staggering economy. In fact, government has increased the expenditure on 
infrastructure. But it is not enough for the thirsty projects. However, there are few 
other long-term financing options available in China. The country does not have a 
developed bond market yet and all debt issues require cumbersome central 
government approval and bank loans merely extend beyond three years. In the past 
China could seek capital inflows by foreign investors, but now China put itself into 
dilemma. The shut down of GITIC may cut the capital conduct at the time when 
China urgently needs these capitals. 
3.2 Political area 
Conflicting polices damaged the image of the government. At least, in the eyes of some 
foreign investors, the government is undermining its own rules. S o m e facts underline 
their allegation: 
1. The decision to bail out insolvent Guangdong Enterprise (GDE) sent a conflicting 
signal to the international banking community about the central government's 
intention to establish a credit system for corporate in line with international practice. 
However, it has also undermined Beijing's stated resolve of divorcing government 
from business. Is this the emergence of a system under which only a selected few 
companies will continue to enjoy government support? Is there a last chance for the 
other non-financial institution investment arms of provincial governments? W h o will 
37 
have the authority to decide whether these companies deserve a last chance or not, 
and on what basis? 
2. Although Beijing's ban on government guarantees and its policy of separating 
government from business, the Tianjin government still pledged to support its 
international and trust corporation by repaying foreign debts. Such a pledge has 
highlighted doubt over whether provincial governments are allowed to make such 
commitments. Without clarification on these issues, what principles should the 
international banking community use in lending to mainland corporations^^ 
3- The Guangdong provincial government had said that preferential treatment would be 
extended concerning the repayment of foreign debts. However, later it reversed that 
policy，saying it could not do so. N o w the claims of those creditors that did registered 
their debts and attempted lend to identifiable projects with really cash flows are 
treated equally with the claims of banks that entered into highly speculative 
derivatives contracts without approval. However those Chinese who illegally 
deposited money in GITIC had been told that they would be repaid in full. 
As GITIC shows, China seems to do what it believes in China's interest with scant 
regard to its own earlier rules. Such impression to foreign lenders will make a growing 
number of private equity funds write the country off until the right to private property 
becomes enshrined in its legislation and China actually shows that it is committed to 
protecting those rights. 
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Regarding the issue of how to dispose of the GITIC's debts, the attitude of government 
invited a barrage of criticism from foreign financial institutions. They argued that the 
government should at least take up the responsibility for the borrowings made in the 
planed economy era. In the market economy era, GITIC was acting on behalf of the 
government and financing projects on behalf of the government. These borrowings had 
been promoted jointly by the GITIC and the provincial government. In planed economy 
era, without the approval or acquiescence of Beijing, it is hard to imagine that these 
provinces dare allow these subsidiaries to borrow so much. It is unprecedented for a 
government not to shoulder responsibility for the collapse of a corporation it had fully 
financed. Moreover, it is the government who declared the end of the planed economy. It 
is a good to separate government function from business. However it is unwise and 
reasonable to separate responsibility at the same time. 
Before the demise of GITIC, mainland lending has largely been "name 丨ending，，with 
credit risk based on the estimated level of support from the respective governmental 
parent. It was neither real corporation credit as defined in a market economy nor 
sovereign or government credit. The closure of GITIC announced the old system was 
effectively shattered. Before a new system is ready to be put in its place, there are 
something that China could do to trade off the negative influence: 
1. Giving fair hearings to foreign investors. Remove the uncertainty and made 
information public on how GITIC's bankruptcy will proceed. 
2. Strengthen regulation on financial institutions. Set up relative laws as the basement 
to supervise the investment behavior. 
3. Forming accounting standards. 
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4. Encouraging business to set up core business. It is easier for government to make 
general regulatory rules. And it is helpful to allocate limited resources to where it is 
mostly needed. 
5. Emphasis on the importance of risk management. 
6. Doing business according to the market rules, in stead of on the basis of political 
factors only. 
No matter what is the criticism, Beijing has showed that government is moving to face 
the moral hazard problem in foreign lending. Bankrupting GITIC according to law has 
demonstrated China's resolve in financial supervision and control according to law. Such 
behaviors are conductive to strengthening the management of financial enterprises and 
enhancing the overall credibility of financial enterprises. 
IV. Overview of the red chips 
GITIC is among the red chip portfolio. Problems highlighted by the bankruptcy of GITIC 
also exist in the other red chips. Before we study the red chip companies as a whole in 
section four, we will have an overview of the history of red chips. 
The terminology of red chips is originated from the jargon "blue chips" which is 
commonly viewed as listed companies with sound fundamentals and growth potential. 
Red chips refer to Hong Kong listed companies that are owned directly or indirectly by 
state institutions, provincial or municipal organizations in Ghina. Red chips are different 
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from H-share companies in that they are not China-incorporated companies but may 
incorporate in Hong Kong or elsewhere overseas. 
In most cases, red chips are overwhelmingly controlled by their parents who have 
intimated relations with ministries or provincial or municipal governments in China. 
Following the expansion and evolution of red chips, some of them are only majority 
owned by the Chinese parents and have diverse shareholders background. A typical 
example is CITIC Pacific Ltd.. It is thirty percent owned by China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC), and the remaining shares have fallen in the hand of 
public investors. (Major names of red chips are attached in Appendix One for reference.) 
Many of these red chip companies were established in 1960s and 1970s when the 
Mainland China was largely closed to the outside world. Hong Kong, because of its 
unique position and historical links, became an obvious window and a springboard to 
outside investments. Since the announcement of the Joint Declaration between the P R C 
and British Governments in 1984 about the hand over of Hong Kong and the 
implementation of "open door" policy by the P R C government in the early 1980s, the 
business activities of Chinese entities in Hong Kong were activated. In the early stage of 
the "open door" policy, provincial and municipal governments in China took a leading 
「ole in developing "communism with style and characteristics of China". Under this 
special political environment, special financing vehicles for these governments have to 
be set up because it is impossible for the provincial and municipal governments to raise 
capital in the means of public offering. These special financing vehicles, which are 
commonly called red chips today, created a massive impact on Hong Kong's financial 
market. 
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In the early 80s, the number of Hong Kong-base firms grew rapidly. Preliminary figures 
indicated there were more than 2000 mainland-controlled firms, excluding those listed 
companies known as H shares in Hong Kong. The actual figure could be much higher as 
many mainland cities and towns, particularly in the coastal area, have evaded 
government approval procedures and set up base in Hong Kong through unofficial 
channels. With the rapid development, many firms started to diversify from trading to 
other sectors, such as manufacturing, tourism, financial services, real estate and 
transportation. S o m e of them have grown into well-known conglomerates, including 
C m C Pacific, Shanghai Industrial, Beijing Enterprises and China Resources. 
The wave of red chips was initiated by the listing of Hai Hong Holdings Co丄tcP. with 
substantial over-subscription in July 1992. After that, follovving the ‘‘open door" policy of 
China and the take-off of economy, more and more P R C concept companies went debut 
in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. During 1994 to 1998, there was a total of twenty-
three red chips debut and raised IPS proceeds for over HKD15796.8 million (See Table 
Five). Buying red chips became an important and popular means for foreign and local 
investors to gain China exposure and capture the benefits of mainland's economy 
growth. 
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Table Five: 1994-1999 IPOs of Hong Kong Stock Market 
1994 52 5 16732.24 983.89 
1995 26 2 8084.86 1569.75 59.55% 
1996 49 4 31215.77 3427.3 118.33% 
1 卯 7 82 11 81653.62 9673.5 182.25% 
1998 32 1 6386.42 142.38 -98.53% 
1999* 2 0 120.88 0 -100% 
Total 243 23 144193.79 15796.82 
till March 3 1 , 1 9 9 9 
Data Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
In 1993, in view of the rising importance of red chips in Hong Kong stock market, Hang 
Seng China-Affiliated Corporation Index (so called "red chip index") was established. 
The number of constituent stocks expanded from nine at the time of establishment to 
forty-eight now (CITIC Pacific is excluded from this index). Up to the end of April 1999, 
the total capitalization of red chips amounted to H K D 146 billion, representing 4.4% of 
total capitalization of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
Hai Hong Holdings Co. Ltd. was a paint-manufacturing subsidiary of China Merchants Steam and Navisation Co Ltd which was 
(lm'?) c f L t r to the Ministry of Communications. Now Hai Hong Holdings Co. Ltd,, is renamed to "China Merchants Holdings 
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Table Six: Market Capitalization of Hong Kong Stock Exchange (unit: H K D Billion) 
Reid Chips (China-affiUated 146 mm^^^^^m 
i _ _ i i _ _ _ _ _ l _ _ _ i i i _ _ _ i i i l _ _ _ : _ 丨 ; _ _ _ i l l i i 隱 l _ l _ _ l l l i 丨 _ l l l _ i l _ ; 丨 lli 丨 ii:丨 寒康 
Corporation Index) 
_ 議 丨 丨 _ 讓 _ 1 _ _ _ 丨 1 _ | _ _ _ | 丨 _ _ _ 丨 翔 _ _ | _ 丨 _ 丨 : 丨 _ _ 丨 丨 丨 養態應丨丨 
Blue Chips (Hang Seng Index) 2736 81.6% 
Total 3354 100% 
Data Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 
1996 and 1997 are the booming years for red chips. At the return of Hong Kong to 
China in 1997, the fad of red chips reached to its peak. Market response was so positive 
that some initial public offerings of red chips were over-subscribed by hundreds times. 
Typical examples were the seven hundred times over-subscription of GITIC Enterprise 
Ltd. in March 1997 and over one thousand and three hundred times over-subscription of 
Beijing Enterprises Holdings Ltd. in May 1997. 
During the two years, most red chips boosted their asset base aggressively by making a 
string of asset injection from the Mainland China and in Hong Kong. Two factors 
motivate the asset expansion: the promising external environment and the internal 
incentive. 
On one hand, the market sentiment was good in 1996 and 1997. Red chips could easily 
get all the funds needed either through equity financing or debt financing. On the other 
hand, after IPOs, red chips had huge sum of new capital to spend o「invest and their 
main objectives were to evolve to large conglomerates by means of asset expansions. 
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So the speed of asset expansion has skyrocketed in the two years, which could be 
evidenced in the following table seven. 
Table Seven: Growth Rate of Total Assets and Return on Assets 
Growth rate of total assets 28.02% 55,91% 18.98% 
Return on assets 2.35% 6.15% -4.24% 
. - -
Data Source: Bloomberg 
However, unlike the H share companies which are often the market leaders in their 
respective areas, the segments of red chip conglomerates are either local-market based 
or insignificant players in china. Attractive investment projects in their respective regions 
or areas are limited compared with the funds in hand. So many red chips have ventured 
into the other areas, where they have no experience o「expertise. 
One profitable investment choice is marketable securities. During the booming period, 
investors were bullish towards the stock market. Although without much management 
and operating expertise in that particular field, red chip companies still can have a very 
good capital gain with the expected surge of the share prices. Hong Kong's property 
market was another investment choice that could grasp a good return in a short time. As 
a matter of fact, the record-high level in 1997 for the property market to a certain extent 
was fuelled by the hot money coming from China and red chips. Investing heavily into 
these two fields has led to the formation of the bubbles in red chip assets during 1997. 
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However, investments in security and property assets in a short-term investment horizon 
are usually with a high degree of speculative nature. In the wake of the Asian financial 
turmoil that started in 1997，as a result the overall credit contraction and the slump of 
both stock market and property market, asset growth rate of most red chips has 
considerably slowed down (see Table Seven and Appendix Four). Since the book value 
of assets piled up during 1996 and 1997 has been inflated considerably, many red chips 
have to make huge provisions or write-off on these assets in the following years in order 
to reflect the actual market value of assets. Consequently their performance deteriorated 
in 1998. It is observed from the above table that despite the positive net change for total 
assets, return on assets for most companies did not exhibit a positive growth trend (see 
Appendix Four for detail). In which case w e can expect that the marginal return from 
these newly acquired assets should be lower than that of the existing ones. 
Moreover, most of the assets acquired by red chips are still operated like state owned 
enterprises. With the continued slowdown in China's economy and the recession of 
Hong Kong after the financial turmoil, it is tougher to maintain profitability amid overall 
declines in return on assets. 
In 1998, credit conditions of red chip companies were tightened. Market sentiment 
changed dramatically after the Asian financial turmoil. The deteriorating of general 
market environment imposed liquidity stress on red chip companies. The most severe 
bmnt occurred after the closure of Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (GITIC). 
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The credit crunch against red chips has an extensive coverage. The impacts have been 
witnessed in some red chips: 
S o m e financial stretched companies are not able to roll over their debts, as many banks 
try to withdraw credit facilities and demand repayment of loans. If cash flows are 
insufficient to meet debt obligations, these firms have to consider liquidating assets at 
forced value given the current market conditions. S o m e of them have already defaulted 
on debt repayment. Their defaults triggered worries over the financial situation of the 
other red chips. 
N e w financing arrangement has substantially slowed down though not completely halted. 
Currently, there is a flight to quality. S o m e red chips, such as CITIC Pacific Ltd., China 
Resources Enterprises Ltd. are still being offered credit from banks. However, even for 
these financial healthy companies, new commercial loans become more difficult to 
secure, as banks are much more cautious about lending to mainland-backed borrowers. 
The risk premium demanded by banks for red chips financing has increased 
considerably. The pinch of rising cost of red chips is mostly reflected on the refinancing 
of some short-term loans on bilateral basis. High risk premium has led to the ongoing 
falling price of some seasoned bonds issued by red chips. 
In addition, banks are actively cutting back their exposures to red chips and the other 
China-affiliated companies. According to the Hong Kong Monetary authonV^ total 
exposure of the banking sectors to red chips, H shares, other state, provincial or 
2 4 Hong Kong Monetary authority, “Hong Kong Banking Sector 's Exposure to Non-bank Chinese entities", May 6. 1999. 
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municipal government owned entities and other entities known to be owned or controlled 
by Chinese interests was declined by 8.6% from September to December 1998 (see 
Table Eight). 
Table Eight: Banking Exposure to China-backed Companies 
HKD Billion Sept. 30，98 Dec. 31’ 98 Percent change 
GITIC 6.2 7 -11.4% 
siiissMgg J 
Other ITICs 39.6 40.4 -2% 
Red chips and other China- 251.7 278 -9.5% 
affiliated companies 
Total China Exposure 297.5 325.4 -8.6% 
^  
Records of Basis Point also prove the decreased exposure. Before the credit crunch, red 
chips were very active in the syndicated loan market especially in the bull market run in 
1996 and 1997. However, the number of transactions fell drastically afterwards. Up to 
June 1999，only one new financing activity of red chips was reported compared to the 
total of 160 new deals completed in Hong Kong debt market this period (see Table Nine). 
Table Nine: Number of Transactions Completed in Hong Kong Debt Market 
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Year Red chips Hong Kong Percentage Red Chips Hong Kong Percentage 
1993 9 180 5% 5686 101510 5.6% 
1994 19 285 6.7% 11280 165013 6.8% 
1995 32 255 12.5% 46518 153853 30.2% 
1996 30 333 9% 42896 240855 17.8% 
1997 41 446 9.2% 72773 539788 13.5% 
1998 16 498 3.2% 38331 217992 17,6% 
1999* 1 160 1.3% 1162 108717 1.1% 
Total 148 2,157 6.9% 218619 1527727 14.3% 
* till June, 1999 
Data Source: Basis Point 
The credit crunch extended to the parent companies of red chips, too. Creditors are 
more cautious than before about the debt-servicing ability of the parent companies. 
Because the ability and incentive of a weak parent will result in taking up assets from the 
subsidiary or passing burden to the subsidiary with additional l iabi l i t ies,^^ it is also 
possible that a parent's bankruptcy will force the subsidiary's bankruptcy. 
The parent/subsidiary credit link between red chips and their parent companies is tight. 
In most circumstance, these parent companies were established long before the listing 
of their subsidiaries. During the listing and expansion of their red chip subsidiaries, the 
parent companies have incurred considerable debts, as they are unable to raise equity 
funds in the capital market. Thus they are weak in financial fundamentals with high 
leverage and low liquidity of assets. Severe liquidity problems of parent companies 
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somehow will spill over to the red chip subsidiaries. For example, the listing of GITIC 
Enterprises was suspended due to the bankruptcy of GITIC; Guangdong Investment has 
to be encompassed into the debt-restructuring plan for its parent Guangdong Enterprises. 
If the compromised restructuring plan can not be reached with the creditors, Guangdong 
Investment will face the same risk as GITIC Enterprise did. 
The increasing credit crunch also adds great pressure to the reform and openness of 
China. China is now undergoing the transferring from the planed economy to market 
economy. The stated owned enterprises (SOEs) play an important role in the market 
economy. The reform of S O E s is crucial for the success of the reform. Capital is highly 
needed. However, the tightened credit condition makes it more difficult to raise funds 
overseas. 
Series problems of red chips shake their important role in fund raising. Their importance 
may begin to fade away for the following reasons. First, China's domestic capital market 
has been developing rapidly in recent years, hence its reliance on foreign capital has 
been reducing. More and more equity funds are being raised in the domestic stock 
market than in the offshore market by red chips. In 1994, equity funds raised in domestic 
equity market as only USD$1082 billion, but grew to US$ 8632 billion in 1998. While 
equity funds raised by red chips in Hong Kong dropped from US$ 1276 billion in 1994 to 
US$ 1071 billion in 1998.26 
In addition, the domestic equity market is far more active in terms of trading for China 
corporates, as evidenced from the fact that the combined trading turnover of Shanghai 
” O n e example is the minority shareholders of Shanghai Holdings Co. Ltd. once invalidated the asset injection plan of the parent 
company, which was blamed for injecting assets with high premium to secure cash and reduce debts. 
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and Shenzhen A and B shares is several times the turnover of red chips in Hong Kong. 
For example, during the robust year of 1997，the combined trading volume of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen A and B shares was U D $ 371 billion while the figure was only U S $ 120 
billion for red chips. 
Second, the cost of domestic capital is now cheaper than that of foreign capital^ .^ In the 
past, the cost of domestic R M B loans was much higher than that of U S dollar or H K 
dollar loans. So companies liked to make use of foreign capital out of cost consideration. 
However, with a sequential reduction in domestic interest rates and the possibility on the 
devaluation of R M B , companies prefer to utilize the domestic capital market. 
Third, the management of red chips can not keep pace with company expansion. Many 
of the investments are not properly managed and run into problem. Due to the lack of 
transparency and monitoring on their operations, it is getting difficult for red chips to 
raise capital in foreign markets where investors are more sophisticated. 
Fourth, the function of red chips does not really conform to the State policy. The central 
government expects to have a finite pool of capital that will be invested in mainland 
assets and prefers to have those capital directed to specific industries that need to be 
reformed. It is understood that Beijing's preferred path is H shares, wherein companies 
retain their China incorporation and are mostly related to pillar industries advocated by 
the central government. 
Data f rom Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia，China Research “Red chip Cong lomera t e s " by Dr. Charles . May 1999 
” I n early 1994. R M B working capital loan rate was about 4 . 5 % higher than Hong Kong pr ime rate but the d i f fe rence was reversed to 
2 % lower since 1998. 
51 
In view of the above trends, it is undeniable that the spectacular role of red chips is 
facing challenges. So it is not only interesting but also meaningful to make a detailed 
investigation on the red chips as a group. Furthermore, rapid expansion and 
diversification are seriously questioned as the main factors causing the tragic failure or 
low productivity of these red chip companies, therefore w e decide to devote our next 
section to studying the value effect of diversification in these red chip companies as a 
group. 
Section Four: General Analysis One: Corporate Cost of Capital and the 
Return on Corporate Investment 
In this section, w e will investigate the performance of non-financial red chips at an 
aggregate level. Using the methodology developed by Fama and French (1999)，we 
evaluate the performance by comparing the costs of capital with the return on 
investment. 
A traditional estimate of a firm's cost of capital is the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC). Mathematically, W A C C can be expressed as: 
WACC = W[5 + W丨 
5 2 
When W A C C = weighted average cost of capital 
E 
We = — - 二 market value of equity over market value of all financing 
D + h 
Wd = = market value of debt over market value of all financing 
Tc 二 marginal corporate tax rate when interest is fully tax deductible 
or, more generally, the debt financing subsidy in percentage terms 
「E = the expected return on equity to investors 
「D = the expeted return on debt to investors 
This approach is straightforward for individual firms since the mix of securities in a firm's 
capital structure and the rates it pays on debts are known. But at the aggregate 
corporate level, it is difficult to know the aggregate quantities and returns for privately 
placed debts while privately placed debts are c o m m o n ways of financing. Many debts 
also occurred as syndicate loans and bilateral loans. The costs of these debts are hard 
to estimate. Adding the difficulty of estimating expected returns, we take a different 
approach which is less fraught with measurement errors. 
This approach takes the entire non-financial red-chips as an investment project. The 
cost of capital for the non-financial sectors is estimated as the internal rate of return on 
value (IRR on value), which equates the initial market values of firms with the present 
values of their post-entry net cash flows and their terminal market values. The internal 
rate of return on cost (IRR on cost) is calculated on the cost of corporate investments. It 
is an estimate of the return delivered by the corporate sectors. If the IRR on cost 
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exceeds the IRR on value, corporate investments on average add value. The difference 
between these two IRRs is the value added from corporate investments. 
The IRR on value is a useful benchmark with many potential applications. It is a starting 
point for cost of capital estimates for individual firms that differ from the aggregate 
because of differences in risk and target capital structure. The IRR on value is an 
estimate of what investors would have earned during the sample period by passively 
investing in all corporate securities as they enter the sample. It is also a good 
benchmark forjudging the investment performance of institutions like pension funds and 
endowment funds. 
In this section, w e calculate the IRR on value and the IRR on cost of the non-financial 
red chips during the year 1992-1998. From the calculation, w e also get information 
about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions. W e will 
address the following four questions in the thesis: (1) the capital structure of red chips 
year by year and its dynamic changes at aggregate level (2) the costs of capital for red 
chips at an aggregate level. (3) the interaction of investment and financing decisions (in 
the form of internal generated cash, the newly issued equity, the long-term debt and 
short-term debt) (4) At current stage of capital market development and ownership 
structure whether diversification is value destroying for red chips. 
1. Sample Description 
Bloomberg is the primary database for this thesis. Asian Company Handbook is used for 
double checking the data. 
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W e choose year 1992 as the initial year because the wave of red chip listing was ignited 
in 1992 when Hai Hong Holding Co. Ltd. was listed with over subscription. After that, 
encouraged by the good sentiment of market and the "open door" policy, more and more 
China-affiliated firms went debut in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Due to the time 
limit of data, w e take year 1998 as the terminal year. However, year 2004 is the 
preferred because at that time most of the red chips have completed a full business 
cycle. 
Our sample includes fifty-one equities whose market value covers 93.63 percent of the 
red chip sample (see Appendix One). Components of the sample are chosen based on 
the Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporate Index (HSCCI)''. Besides, Shanghai Ind. Hdlg. 
(363 HK EQY), China Telecomm (941 HK EQY), CITIC Pacific (267 HK EQY) and Guangdong 
Investment (270 HK EQY) are included in the sample. Although they are the components 
of the Hang Seng Index now, they are closely China-related. W e eliminate financial firms 
from our sample, because many of their assets are claims on the other firms. W h e n 
these financial firms invest on the securities of the other firms, the market value of the 
securities appears in investment in the IRR on value and IRR on cost. Since there is no 
way to wash out the double counting of corporate assets, w e exclude financial firms out 
of our sample. 
2. Research Methodology Description: 
- I n 1993. an index named The Hang Seng China-Affi l iated Corporate Index (HSCCI) was created to reflect the stock price 
performance o f H K listed companies with significant equity controlled by entities in Mainland China. 
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2.1 Definitions: 
The internal rate of return is discount rate that sets the net present value of cash 
inflows and outflow of corporate sector equal to zero. Algebraically, the IRR on value 
and IRR on cost are the discount rates that solve, 
r(1998) ^  J r(1998) PR -dt/ t V 
IV ^ y ‘ ~ ' I y hs, -FBv, I 
r(^8) ^ r r(1998) J^ ^ J^J^厂 tt/ 
IC = y ‘ ‘ I y 队 丨 丨 T 厂 1998 
/Fo is the aggregate initial market value of firms that enter the sample at the beginning of 
the IRR estimation period, 1992. 
ICq is the aggregate initial book value of firms that enter the sample at the beginning of 
the IRR estimation period, 1992. 
Xt is aggregate cash earnings (after tax but before deduction of interest and depreciation) 
for firms in the sample in year t 
't is the aggregate gross investment (net investment plus depreciation) of these firms 
in year t. 
FSt (firms sold during the year t) is the terminal market value of firms that leave the sample 
in yeart 
FBVt (firms bought at market value during the year t) is the initial market value of firms that 
enter the sample in year t 
FBCt (firms bought at cost during the year t) is the initial book value of firms that enter the 
sample in yeart 
TVi998 is the terminal value of firms that exist at the end of the sample period (year 1998) 
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2.2 S o m e Details 
The estimates of the market capital and book capital of firms include only debt that 
pays explicit interest (long-term debt plus short-term debt in current liabilities). Other 
obligations, like accounts payable, are excluded from market capital (IVo, FBVt, FSt 
and TV i998) and book capital (ICo and FBCo) for two reasons. First, measured cash 
earnings, Xt, are net of implicit interest payments. Including liabilities that do not pay 
explicit interest in market or book capital would thus bias the IRRs downward. 
Second, non-interest-paying liabilities are often the result of intercorporate financial 
intermediation. Including them in the market or book values of firms would overstate 
the market and book capital of the corporate sector. For the same reason, w e 
measure net investment (It less depreciation) as the change from year t-1 to year t in 
a firm's book capital (total assets minus non-interest-paying debt). 
In the IRR on value, the initial investment in a firm is its market value when it enters 
the sample (IVo or FBVt). In the IRR on cost, the initial investment in a firm is the cost 
of the assets it brings into the sample (ICo or FBCt). Thereafter, the two IRRs use the 
same annual net cash flows (Xt-lt) and the same terminal values of firms, either when 
they leave the sample (FSt) or at the end of the sample period (TV1998). Except for 
FSt, FBVt and FBCt, the two equations look like the standard expression that defines 
the IRR for an investment project. FSt, FBVt and FBCt appear in the equations 
because to estimate IRRs for the investment project represented by the entire non-
financial corporate sector we must account for entry and exit of firms. 
57 
In the terminal market values of firms used to calculate the IRR on value and IRR on 
cost，only c o m m o n stock is measure by the market value. W e measure other 
liabilities (short-term debt, long-term debt and preferred stock) at book value. 
Because a large percent of corporate debt takes the form of either privately placed 
bonds or bank loans that do not generally trade, market value of debt is often difficult 
to calculate. As a result, the amount of debt in a firm's capital structure is generally 
measured at its book value. Likewise, in the estimate of initial market value in the 
IRR on value, only c o m m o n stock is measured at market. 
丁here are three equivalent interpretations of the IRR on value. Most directly, it is an 
estimate of what investors would have earned during the sample period by passively 
investing in all corporate securities as they enter the sample. Second, the IRR on 
value is also an estimate of the overall cost of capital for non-finandaj firms. Using 
the standard valuation equation to the whole non-financial corporate sector, w e can 
back out the corporate cost of capital. Third, the IRR on value is the compound 
return on the initial market values of all the securities of non-financial firms, including 
the securities they issue after they enter the sample. To see this, note that since the 
cash inflows (cash earnings, Xt，plus net new securities issued, NSt) must equal to 
the cash outflows (the sum of dividends paid, Div, interest expenses, Int，and the 
investment, It). Annual cash inflows will match the cash outflows, so 
X, + NS, =1, + Div, + Int 丨 
X, -1, = Div, + Int, - NS, 
台 G +。)’ 台 G + nY (i + nf 
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The last equation says that the IRR on value is the compound return on all the 
securities of non-financial firms outstanding during the IRR estimation period, the 
securities purchased at market vale when firms enter the sample (IVO o「FBt) and the 
securities (NSt) later issued to finance cash outlays. 
The IRR on value is not the return from investing a dollar in the market portfolio at 
the beginning of the IRR estimation period, and then rolling the investment into the 
market portfolios available in subsequent years. Instead, the IRR on value captures 
the actual history of wealth invested in the corporate sector. The IRR on value 
requires net new investment in any year when net cash flow from operations and 
funds needed to cover the difference between the market values of exiting and 
entering firms (Xt-lt+FSt-FBt) is negative. W h e n (Xt-lt+FSt-FBt) is positive, this 
approach reduced the value of invested wealth. The net flow is negative in seven 
years for our sample. 
In measuring cash earnings, Xt is net of implicit interest payment. It equals to cash 
from operating plus the interest expense. Investment (It) is the change from year t-1 
to year t in a firm's book capital (equals to the sum of the book value of long-term 
debt, short-term debt and equity). The terminal market value of the firms is the sum 
of the book value of long-term debt and short-term debt and the market value of 
common stock. Similarly in estimating the IRR on value, only common stock is 
measured by market value. In next section, we will show that using book value to 
measure debts will not cause too much er「o「in IRRs. 
2.3 Possible Problems with the method 
59 
(1) Double-counting in IRRs 
W h e n firms invest in the securities of the other firms, the market value of the 
securities will appear in investment in both the IRR on both value and the IRR on 
cost. There is no way to eliminate the double counting properly. 
(2) Short sample period 
W e use the realized returns to draw inferences about the expected returns. Longer 
estimation period provides more reliable estimates of expected returns. The short 
sample period will leave little space for investors to cure their unwise over-
confidence of the red chip companies. A longer period is needed for the market to 
cool down by the later unprofitable investment. 
(3) Upside bias 
W e measure the components of the IRR on value (initial market values of firms, post-
entry cash flows and terminal market value) rather accurately, so the estimates of the 
IRR on value are accurate. In the IRR on cost, however, the assets (net of non-
interest-paying liabilities) that firms hold when they enter the sample are measured at 
「ported book value. There is no adjustment for the replacement cost of reported 
assets and past investments in intangible assets are unreported. As a result, w e 
understate the initial assets of entering firms and overstate the IRR on cost. This 
problem can be partially offset by longer sample period because (Xt-lt) includes the 
expenditure on intangible assets and it is measured accurately. But our sample 
period is rather short. Substantial measurement error in initial cost will overturn the 
conclusion that the return on the cost of corporate investment exceeds the corporate 
cost of capital. 
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3. Investigation over the Results 
3.1 The capital structures and Financing decisions 
Firms raise investment funds in a number of ways. They can borrow from banks and 
other financial institutions or they can issue various kinds of debt, preferred stock 
and c o m m o n equity. A firm's mix of these different sources of capital is referred to as 
its capital structure. The capital structure of a corporate can affect capital allocation 
decisions. In the following part, w e will show the evolution of the overall corporate 
capital structure in response to earnings, investment, dividends and interest 
expenses. W e will also prove that measuring debts and preferred stock at book value 
does not cause serious biases in IRR calculation. 
(1) Capital structures: 
Table I describes aggregate capital structures for (1) all firms in the sample during 
the current and previous years (All firms). (2) firms that enter the sample during the 
year (Initial Year). The average shares of different classes of liabilities are expressed 
as percent of either total market capital or book capital. The total market capital is the 
sum of the market value of common stock plus the book value of long-term debt and 
short-term debt. The total book capital is the total end-of-year book value of long-
term debt, short-term debt and common stock. The value of common stock is 
calculated either with the stock price or with the book value per share times the 
shares outstanding. 
Table I also reports the debt to equity ratios calculated both by market value and the 
book value of the firm's equity. Because the market value of equity measures the 
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firm's discounted future cash flows, ratios with market values in the denominator are 
good measures of the firms' future ability to meet the interest payments. The book 
value of equity is determined by how well the firm has done in the past. Ratios with 
book value of equity are not as reliable indicators of firms' ability to meet the interest 
payments. However, they indicate how firms have historically financed their new 
investments. 
Averaging over the annual estimate from 1992-1998, 69.03 percent of the combined 
book value of firms in the sample is c o m m o n equity, 0.03 percent is preferred stock, 
19.06 percent is long-term debt and 11.877 percent is short-term debt. It shows that 
during 1992-1998 sample period, common stock is the main external financing 
source. 
C o m m o n equity's share of book capital is low before 1995. Most of the decline is 
picked up by the long-term debt, which nearly doubled in 1994 about 22.5 percent, 
and kept rather high in 1995 at 24.175 percent. This trend began to shift since 1995. 
The share of common equity reached to its climax in 1997 at 70.95 percent. Such 
change matches the boom of the stock market in 1996 and 1997. Due to the good 
market sentiment, it was easy for firms to raise funds in the stock market. The debt to 
equity ratio (D/E ratio) calculated by the book value of equity further evidenced the 
prosperous stock market. During the year 1992 to year 1995, the D/E ratio kept on 
increasing, showing that firms increased to use debt financing. However in 1996 and 
1997，the D/E ratio decreased under the level in 1993. 
Preferred stock is the least important source of financing. In the seven years its 
share is almost zero. Perhaps it is partly because there are no utilities (the major 
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issuers of preferred stock) in the sample. There is also a modest increase in short-
term debt's share of aggregate value in 1994 and 1995 to compensate the decrease 
of the share of equity. Its share increased abruptly in 1998 because under the 
pressure after the financial crisis, most creditors are unlike to extend the long-term 
debt. 
Due to the limit of sample periods, there is no entity left the sample. So w e do not 
know whether the capital structure of firms leaving the sample will be similar to those 
of all firms exist. So from the point of capital structure, w e still do not know whether 
capital structure is an important factor behind the leaving of firms. 
There is some interesting difference between the capital structures of all firms and 
firms entering the sample. Averaging over the annual estimate from 1992-1997，new 
firms have larger fraction of their book value in c o m m o n stock. From 1992-1997, 
c o m m o n equity averages 74.01 percent of the book value of entering firms, while it is 
69.03 percent for all firms. The deduction in equity's share as firm mature is 
absorbed by long-term debt and short-term debt, which increase by 7.16 percent and 
2.21 percent. The debt to equity ratio for the entering firms kept on falling since year 
1993. Although there was an increase in year 1996，it was still ten percent less than 
the ratio in 1992. The D/E ratio for all firms in the sample is relatively stable 
compared with that for entering firms. Such difference is consistent with the 
argument that debt is a more efficient form of financing for mature firms. 
The internal rate of return on corporate value requires estimates of each firm's initial 
market value, and the IRR on value and IRR on cost require terminal market values. 
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Table I says that the market value of c o m m o n equity, which w e measure with little or 
no error, is about 85.29 percent of initial value. W e use book value to proxy for the 
market value of preferred stock, long-term debt and short-term debt. There is 
probably little difference between book and market values for short-term debt, which 
accounts for 8 percent of the initial firm value. So Table I suggests that measurement 
error is not an issue for about 94.3 percent of the initial market values of the firms in 
the sample. Measurement error is also probably not a big issue for the initial market 
values of preferred stock and long-term debt. Firms entering the sample are unlikely 
to be in default on their debt or preferred stock, so on average the book vale of these 
securities is probably an unbiased estimate of their market value. 
In sum, our estimates of the initial and terminal market values of firms are rather 
accurate. Since w e estimate cash flows accurately, the measurement error probably 
is not much of an issue in the IRR calculation. 
The last address in this partg is that firms have target capital structures based on 
book value of capital. Figure One and Figure Two describe the components of the 
aggregate corporate capital structure as shares of book capital and market capital. 
C o m m o n equity's share of book capital is relatively stable during the years, while that 
of market capital fluctuates greatly, which is due to the variation of stock price. Since 
the book leverage is more stable than the market leverage, it is tempting to conclude 
that the leverage targets of firms are typically a function of book capital not market 
capital. 
(2) Cash flows and financing decisions. 
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The capital structure in Table I and Figure one and two are the results of the way 
firms respond to the period-by-period constraint that cash outflows must be met by 
cash inflows. By examining the components of cash inflows and outflows, w e can get 
an additional perspective on how firms are financed. Table II summarizes the 
components of aggregate annual inflows and outflows. The flows are expressed as 
proportions of the aggregate beginning of year book capital (book assets less non-
interest-paying debt) of the firms in the sample. 
In a certain period, cash inflows equal to cash outflows. If the internal funds can not 
satisfy the need of investment and payments to investors, external fund will be raised. 
The inflows are cash earnings (Xt； earnings before interest but after taxes, Yt, plus 
depreciation Dpt), the net flow from issuing and repurchasing common and preferred 
stock (dSt), and the net flows from issuing and redeeming long-term debt (dLTDt) 
and short-term debt (dSTDt). The outflows are gross investment (It), dividends (Divt) 
and interest expense (Intt). So w e get, 
r, + Dp, + dS, + dLTD, + dSTD, = / , + M 丨 + Div 丨 
X, + NSi =1, + Div 丨 + Int 丨 
Xt is the internal fund (cash earnings). NSt is the net change of securities (equal to 
the sum of net changes of long-term debt, short-term debt and capital). 
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Table II shows that, on average, internal fund is less than investment outlays. Gross 
investment by existing firms (It, the change in book capital plus depreciation) 
averages 50.73 percent of book capital, while cash earnings (Xt) are 9.23 percent of 
book capital. At the same time, firms make great payment to securities holders, 
especially to stockholders. /Vnnual dividends and interest payments consume 61.32 
percent of the cash earnings (after tax but before interest and depreciation), among 
which 38.14 percent is paid as dividends. As a result, the non-financial corporate 
sectors have to issue new securities regularly. This may not be a reasonable 
behavior of new listed companies. Because at the developing stage of business, 
firms should choose to keep as much fund as they could for the needs of the further 
development. 
During 1992-1998, the cash outflow, (It+Div+Int) for non-financial firms averages 
56.39 percent of book capital. Cash earnings average 9.23 percent of book capital. 
丁he difference is compensated by the cash flow from the issuing of new securities. 
Issues of c o m m o n stock accounts for 70.12 percent of the shortfall. N e w issues long-
term debt takes up 18.28 percent of the shortfall. The issue of short-term debt makes 
up the rest 11.6 percent of the new financing. 
Table III focuses on how firms finance investment. There are two sources of funds 
financing firms' investment: internal fund and external fund. Internal fund comes from 
the retained cash earnings (cash earnings after the interest payments and dividend 
payments, RCEt=丫t+Dpt-lntt-Divt). External funds are from the net changes of capital 
(dS)，long-term debt (dLTDt) and short-term debt (dSTDt). 
66 
/, 二 RCE, + dS, + dLTD丨 + dSTD, 
RCE, =Y, +Dp, 一 Int 丨-Div, 
Investment averages 50.73 percent of book capital in 1992-1998 and internally 
generated funds after paying the interest and dividends covers 7.04 percent of 
investment. N e w issue of stock (net of share repurchases) finances 65.19 percent of 
investment and the rest 27.78 percent is covered by debts. (61.18 percent of long-
term debt and 38.82 percent of short-term debt) 
Figure Three and Figure Four show investment and its financing year by year. Figure 
Three suggests that net new issues of stock move closely with investment when the 
variables are measured relative to book capital as in Table III. From figure three, w e 
coUd see the investment and stock financing is highly correlated. The correlation 
coefficient between It and dS is 0.99，nearly perfect positively matches each other. 
It is contradicted to the general argument that debt is a more efficient financing way 
than stocks due to the higher cost of issuing stocks. The correlation coefficient 
between investment and debt is also very high about 0.82, among which 0.59 
between It and short-term debt and 0.77 between It and long-term debt. Here w e like 
to mention the larger correlation coefficient between It and dSTD. After the break of 
financial crisis in Asia, red-chips are under pressure by the creditors. Lenders' calling 
for reimbursement of their loans drags red chip companies. It is hard to extend the 
long-term debts. So the amount of short-term debts increased dramatically about 33 
percent in 1998. This shift may have some influence on the correlation coefficient. 
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Exclude the factor, firms in the sample are more likely to use long-term debts to 
finance the investment. 
3.2 IRR on value and IRR on cost 
Table V reports the nominal internal rates of return on the initial market values of the 
securities of non-financial red chip firms and on the cost of their investments. Table V 
also summarizes the way initial assets, earnings, investment outlays, and terminal 
values combine to produce the IRRs on value and cost. W e also calculate the simple 
annual return (Rt). 
The IRR on cost (the return on corporate investment) during 1992-1998 is 7 percent. 
The IRR on value (the estimated cost of capital) is much smaller. In fact, it is even 
negative, about negative 10 percent. Thus corporate investment on average seems 
to be profitable. The difference between these two IRRs is the value added. 
The differences between the IRRs on cost and value are due entirely to differences 
between the market and book values of firms when they enter the sample. In the 
return on value, we add firms to the sample at their initial market values. In the return 
on cost, we add firms at their initial book values. Both IRRs use the same net cash 
flows and the same final market values when we sell them at the end of the sample 
period (here is at the end of year 1998). The market value of firms entering the 
sample exceeds the book value in all the years. These positive differences between 
the market and book values of entering firms are the reason the IRR on cost exceed 
the IRR on value. 
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From the table, w e could see that the net cash earnings (Xt-lt) by the firms in the 
sample are poor. In all the years, it is negative, which means the cash earnings can 
not meet the need of investment. Firms made huge investment after they entered the 
sample，thus the terminal values of the firms contribute more to the IRRs than the 
annual stream of net cash flows, Xt-lt. 
Over-confidence about red chip companies m a y be a major reason for the negative 
IRR on value. During the sample period, on average, the stock prices of red chips 
a「e increasing, which makes the initial market value of entering firms (FBVt) much 
higher than the initial book value (FBCt). Moreover, many firms' parent companies 
infused a lot of assets after the window companies were listed in the stock exchange. 
It is also quite c o m m o n that the window companies transfer their assets in the form 
of investment. But the earnings did not increase as much as the investment. All 
these factors contribute to the shortfall of net cash earnings (Xt-lt) and thus the 
negative IRR on value. Although the market value of entering firms should be low to 
reflect expected losses on future investments when corporate investment is on 
average worth less than the cost of capital. There is no long history of evidence for 
investors to cure thei「over-confidence. That is why the IRR on cost exceeds the IRR 
on value. In Appendix Five, w e list the return on assets for non-financial red chip 
firms. The average return on assets during 1992-1998 is 2.1 percent, which is much 
lower than the growth rate of assets. Although the return on asset is calculated by 
the accounting profit, which is different from the internal rate of return, it still shows 
that corporate investment is not so profitable as the IRR shows. 
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In the Table V’ w e also calculate the simple return on wealth invested in the non-
financial corporate sector. The simple return for year t is: 
P 一 ( 足 - / , ) + (厂,-厂,一1) Div, +Int, +{V, -NS,) 
八 / — 一 - — — — 
Vt and Vt-1 are the aggregate values of firms that have market value data for the end 
of both year t-1 and year t. NSt is the value of net new securities issued by these 
firms during year t. (Vt-NSt-Vt-1) is an estimate of the aggregate capital gain from 
year t-1 to year t on the market value of their securities outstanding at t-1. Rt is an 
estimate of the simple return for year t on the market value of wealth invested in the 
non-financial corporate sector at the end of year t-1. It is also an estimate of the 
return from year t-1 to t on the market portfolios of non-financial corporate securities 
outstanding at year t-1. The expected value of Rt is the year t weighted average cost 
of capital ( W A C C ) for the non-financial corporate sector in a world where market 
values are obtained by discounting cash flows at expected simple returns on value. 
This is the most commonly used concept in many corporate finance textbooks. 
There are large differences between the IRR on value and the geometric mean of the 
simple returns. A small part of the difference occurs because some of the firms in the 
IRR calculation are not included in the simple return calculation. To calculate simple 
return for year t, the market value data for year t-1 and year t are needed. In contrast, 
the IRR on value only requires that firms have value data for their first and last years 
in the sample. Most of the difference between the IRR on value and geometric mean 
of simple return arises because the two approaches weight annual returns differently. 
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The geometric mean of the simple return puts the same weight on each annual 
return. The weight used in the IRR on value is non-financial invested wealth at the 
beginning of the year, discounted to the beginning of the sample period at the IRR on 
value. Thus, later year tend to get more weight because invested wealth is larger, but 
the discounting of invested wealth tends to give later years less weight. So the 
middle years which include most of the negative cash flows push the IRR on value 
down. Which one is the better estimate of the return on value? The IRR on value 
allows for the net new investment required to finance the growth of the non-financial 
sector, the IRR on value in a more accurate estimate of the realized return on the 
wealth allocated to the non-financial corporate sector than the geometric means of 
simple annual return. But if w e want to use a compound return on value at estimate a 
forward-looking cost of capital, the geometric mean of the simple annual return may 
be better. 
4. Co门elusion 
W e estimate an internal rate of return (IRR) that equals the initial market values of 
non-financial red chip firms with the present values of their year by year post entry 
net cash flows and their terminal market values. This return on value is an estimate 
of the non-financial corporate cost of capital. The IRR on values incorporate the net 
transfers of wealth into and out of the corporate sector that occur each year. So it 
provides good estimates of the compound return on wealth allocated to the non-
financiaj red-chips. Another concept is the compound return to a dollar invested in 
the non-financial red-chips at the beginning of the return estimation period. The 
return is obtained by compounding annual simple returns. It is less accurate than the 
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IRR on value when w e want to estimate the rerun on wealth allocated to the non-
financial red-chips. But it may be a better estimation of the cost of capital. 
W e also estimate the internal rates of return delivered by the non-financial red-chips 
on the cost of capital. O n average the IRR on cost (the delivered return on 
investment) exceeds the IRR on value (the estimate of the cost of capital), so the 
investment by the firms is profitable. However, the conclusion will be overturned if 
the replacement cost is large enough. Because w e measure the assets of entering 
firms with the historical cost so there is an upward bias on the IRR on cost. 
W e investigate the relationship between the investment activities and financing 
methods. Firms make great investment after they enter the sample. The cash 
earnings can not satisfy the need of investment. Funds from the issue of stocks pick 
up most of the pitfall. 
Section Five: General analysis Two: Diversification and Corporate Stock Return 
In this section, we will investigate the effect of diversification from the point of the 
relationship between diversification changes and stock returns. Our formal regression 
analysis correlates fiscal-year focus index (measured by revenue-based Herfindahl 
Index) with both fiscal year stock returns and prior fiscal-year returns, using a 
multivariate cross-sectional regression. 
1. Measure of Focus: 
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There are four different measures of focus (concentration on core businesses; 
specialization): (1) the proportion of firms reporting just one segment, (2) the number 
of segments reported by management, (3) a revenue-based Herfindahl index and (4) 
an asset-based Herfindahl index. W e choose the revenue-based Herfindahl index to 
measure the degree of focus because only the breakdown of turnover is reported for 
the red chip companies. 
A revenue-based Herfindahl index reflects the degree to which revenues are 
concentrated in just a few of a company's business segments. It is calculated across 
Njt segments for the jth firm in the fiscal year t as the sum of the squares of each 
segment's revenue as a proportion of total revenue: 
Nj, ( y 
Re venue 一 based Herfindahl Index = ^ X小 / ^ X.小 
Xijt is the revenue attributable to a segment. Segment revenue is defined to exclude 
inter-company sales, interest, non-operating income, equity in earnings of 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other income, rental income, gain on sale of securities 
or fixed assets, discontinued operations and excise taxes. 
2. Regression Description 
〇u「sample period covers year 1992 to year 1997. Data are derived from Bloomberg. 
Asian Company Handbook provides the breakdown of turnover. 
Our regression test controls for fiscal-year changes in total revenue, total assets, and 
earnings from continuing operations, assuming that wealth effects of focus are 
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secondary to the effects of operating performance. To render these accounting 
measures comparable across firms and time, w e denominated annual dollar 
amounts as fractions of the beginning market value of c o m m o n stock. W e replicate 
our regression analysis using prior-year stock returns because focus changes could 
be announced or anticipated in the year before they take effect. 
Fiscal-year stock return is defined as the simple annual return, which is calculated by: 
厂 二 j P , - 尸，—丨）+ Div , 
W h e r e r^  is the fiscal - year stock return; Div^ is the dividents for year t; 
Pf is the stock price for year t. W e use the last price as the stock price proxy. 
W e also include in our regression models the average market return (measured by 
the return of Hang Seng Index) and the average return of the red chip firms 
(measured by the average return of the Hang Seng China-affiliated Corporation 
Index). Because the whole market atmosphere and specific sentiment to the red chip 
firms have influence on individual stock returns. 
3. Regression Report 
Appendix Eight and Table Six report the regression result for same-year stock 
returns and prior-year stock returns using revenue-based Herfindahl index as the 
measure of focus. 
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The sum the estimates for the two years indicated that an increase in focus of 0.1 is 
associated with an additional stock return of 5.94% (-0.86% in the same year and 6.8% 
in the prior year). However, for the regression with the prior-year stock return as the 
dependent, the coefficient of determination (R-square) is only 0.15. Whereas the R_ 
square for the regression with the same-year return as the dependent is 0.7, which 
indicates a strong relationship between the same-year stock return variable and the 
degree of focus. So w e believe that on average, stock returns and degree of focus is 
negative correlated and thus diversification is value-adding (though small 
significance). 
W e undertake the T-Statistics test to determine whether each coefficient is useful in 
estimating the assessed value of stock returns. The t-observed values for each of 
independent variables are shown in Table Six. Consulting a table in a statistics 
manual, w e will find that t-critical, single tail, with 58 degrees of freedom and Alpha = 
0.05 is 1.677. The absolute value of t for market return, red chip portfolio return and 
measures of performance (changes in operating income and total turnover) is greater 
than 1.677. Therefore, they are important variables when estimating the assessed 
value of stock returns. However, the absolute value oft for the revenue-based 
Herfindahl index is 0.13，which is much smaller than 1.677. So focus has less 
influence on stock return. 
The degree of focus may have influence on the operating performance of firms. The 
diversification strategy may direct the changes of total assets. Therefore, we control 
these factors and run another two sets of regression. The summary regression 
results are reported in Appendix Nine. 
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First, w e assume that both the corporate performance and change of total assets are 
the functions of diversification. The regression shows that the absolute value of t for 
the revenue-base Herfindahl index increases to 0.1525. The coefficient of the focus 
index decreases from -0.086 to -0.1065，which indicates 0.1 increase in 
diversification will bring additional stock return of 1.065%. Second, w e assume that 
changes in total assets are independent to diversification strategy and run a new 
regression. The coefficient of Herfindahl rises to 一 0.146. Its absolute value oft rises 
to 0.2067. Although the significance of focus index increases in explaining the stock 
returns, it still does not meet the t-critical, 1.677. Although small changes in the 
coefficients, the average market return, average return of the red chip portfolio and 
corporate performance are still important factors that explain the stock return. 
Specifically, the changes in operating income have big positive influence on stock 
returns. Its coefficient is average 13. 
Our estimated correlation could be spurious with the revenue-based Herfindahl index 
as the measure of focus. Both stock returns and a revenue-based Herfindahl indexes 
of focus will tend to increase when the primary segment does surprisingly well, 
inflating our estimate of a positive causal relation between them. An offsetting 
negative bias arises when surprising performance occurs in ancillary segments 
instead, but the net effect could be positive (this problem only applies to the same-
year returns). 
Another problem with the use of revenue-based Herfindahl index is that the revenue 
is vulnerable to manipulation. Theoretical models of managerial disclosure decision 
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suggest that managers may have incentives to misstate segment data. Their ability 
to misstate depends on the discretion mangers have to allocate capital between 
segments. Since segment revenues are not specifically identifiable with the segment 
for which they are reported, managers do have some ability to allocate sales and 
greater discretion to allocate expense. Thus, the segment revenue numbers may not 
be as reliable as segment sales and asset figures. 
4. Summary 
Through running multivariate cross-sectional regressions, w e have analyzed the 
correlation between diversification changes and stock returns (the same-year stock 
returns and prior-year stock returns), using revenue-based Herfindahl index as the 
measure of focus. 
Investigating the regression outputs, w e find that stock returns of individual firms are 
highly correlated with the same-year operating performance. The better firms 
performs, the higher stock returns. The stock market reflects corporate performance 
in time. Besides, they are highly correlated with the Hong Kong stock market 
average return (measured by the return of Hang Seng Index). The average return of 
the red chip portfolio has rather significantly positive effect on the individual stock 
mturn. Diversification adds value to the stock returns. However, its wealth effect is 
not significant. From our regression results, we did not find strong support to the 
value-adding effect of diversification. 
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Section Six: Conclusion 
In this thesis, w e investigate the value effect of diversification in one of the emerging 
markets: Hong Kong capital market. W e choose non-financial red chip companies as our 
study object. 
Red chip companies are companies that register in Hong Kong or overseas and 
represent the municipal and provincial governments or various branches of central 
government of People's Republic of China (China). These red chip companies raise 
capitals from the Hong Kong capital market and then allocate these capitals through the 
internal market to various projects within China. With the rapid development, many firms 
have diversified into many areas, such as trading, manufacturing, tourism, financial 
services, real estate and transportation. The unique features of red chips provide a good 
opportunity to study the roles of internal capital markets and the value effect of 
diversification. 
As to the value effect of diversification, previous studies gave out different explanations. 
Theoretically, diversification can be value-enhancing or value-reducing，subject to the 
comparison between benefits and costs that the diversification brings with. The potential 
benefits of diversification (operating different lines of business within one firm) include 
greater operation efficiency and flexibility, less incentive to forego positive net-present-
value projects, greater debt capacity and lower taxes. The potential costs of 
diversification include the use of increased discretionary resources to undertake value-
decreasing investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to rain resources 
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from better-performing segments, and misalignment of incentives between central and 
divisional managers. 
Most recent empirical studies on the developed markets (UK, Germany, Japan, and US), 
have documented that corporate diversification is value-reducing. These researches 
reasoned that because the financial markets in developed countries functioned well 
enough to allocate capital efficiently, the costs related to diversification have outweighed 
the benefits for the average firms operating in the developed capital markets. However in 
emerging markets where market imperfection is much more severe, the evidence on the 
value effect of diversification is mixing. 
Our study begins with a clinic study on the bankruptcy of Guangdong International Trust 
and Investment Corporation (GITIC), which is a well-known diversified conglomerate. 
GITIC's failure shows that its diversification strategy is value-reducing. However, our 
investigation on the shut-down of GITIC disclosed some other factors simultaneously 
contribute to its failure, for example, the inefficient management, the weak regulation, 
the imprudence of foreign creditors and the stress from the financial crisis. 
GITIC is a typical red chip portfolio. Problems highlighted by the bankruptcy of GITIC 
also exist in the other red chips. So what is the real performance of the other red chips? 
Whether diversification also turns out value-reducing for other red chip companies or for 
the whole red chip portfolio? With these questions w e conduct a rigorous academic 
study，using the methodology developed by Fama and French. 
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W e treat the entire non-financial red chip companies as an investment project. W e 
estimate the internal rate of return (IRR) that equates the initial market value of non-
financial firms with the present values of their year-by-year post-entry net cash flows and 
their terminal market values. This return on value (IRR on value) is an estimate of the 
corporate cost of capital. W e also suppose the internal rate of return delivered by the 
non-financial firms on the cost of their investments. The IRR on cost exceeds the IRR on 
value. The difference between them is the value added through corporate investment. 
During our sample period, the IRR on value is negative ten percent. The IRR on cost is 
seven percent. So our data told us on average the corporate investment is profitable. 
This result is out of our expectation. 
Investors' over-confidence about red chip companies may be a major reason for the 
negative IRR on value. During the sample period, on average, the stock prices of red 
chips are increasing, which makes the initial market value of entering firms much higher 
than the initial book value. Moreover, many firms' parent companies infused a lot of 
assets after the window companies were listed in the stock exchange. It is also quite 
common that the window companies transfer their assets in the form of investment. 
However, the earnings did not increase as much as the investment. All these factors 
contribute to the shortfall of net cash earnings and thus the negative IRR on value. 
Although the market value of entering firms should be low to reflect expected losses on 
future investments when corporate investment is on average worth less than the cost of 
capital. There is no long history of evidence for investors to cure their over-confidence. 
That is a strong factor causing IRR on cost exceeds the IRR. 
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In order to further investigate the value effect of diversification, w e did another general 
analysis by studying the relationship between corporate focus and stock returns. Our 
formal regression analysis correlates fiscal-year focus index (measured by revenue-
based Herfindahl Index) with both fiscal year stock returns and prior fiscal-year returns, 
using a multivariate cross-sectional regression. 
Our regression results indicated that diversification does add value. An increase in 
diversification of 0.1 is associated with an additional stock return of 0.86% in the same 
year. Considering the possible influence of diversification on corporate performance and 
changes in total assets, w e control the correlation and run another two sets of 
regressions. The estimates of coefficients remain positively correlated with stock returns. 
Increase in diversification of 0.1 brings more additional stock returns than before control. 
However, the absolute value of t for the revenue-base Herfindahl index is still is much 
smaller than the t-critical, single tail, with 58 degrees of freedom and Alpha = 0.05, which 
is 1.677. So diversification can only marginally explain the stock returns of red chips. 
The average market return, average return of the red chip portfolio and corporate 
operating behavior are highly correlated with stock returns of red chips. Among them, 
the performance of continued operation has significantly positive influence on stock 
returns. The absolute t-statistics value of its coefficient is above 7.6, which is much 
larger than the t-critical value 1.677 with Alpha=0.05. 
However, using the revenue-based Herfindahl index as the measure of focus, our 
estimated correlation could be spurious. For example, both stock returns and a revenue-
based Herfindahl indexes of focus will tend to increase when the primary segment does 
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surprisingly well, inflating our estimate of a positive causal relation between the same-
year returns and degree of focus. Another potential problem with the use of revenue-
based Herfindahl index is that the revenue is vulnerable to manipulation. Thus, the 
segment revenue numbers may not be as reliable as segment sales and asset figures. 
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Table I Non-financial Corporate Structures 
The table shows the average shares of different classes of liabilities, expressed as percents of total market or book capital for (1) all 
firms m the sample at beginning of the year (All firms) (2) firms entering the sample during the y ^ r (Initial year). A firm's market 
capital IS the sum of the market value of its common stock plus the book value of its long-temi debts, short-term debts and 
preferred stock. A firm's book capital is the total end-of-year book value of its long-term, short-term debt and equity The market 
value of common stock is the stock price times shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. Tlie book value of common stock is 
the book value per share times the shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
LT: long-term debts ST: short-term debts Pfd: preferred stock MV: market value 
M V of E Q Y : market value of equity B V of E Q Y : book value of equity 
LT ST Pfd M V o f E Q Y BV of EQY Market Capita Book capital 
1 卯 1 4 3 9 5 . 3 4 2 7 9 9 . 8 7 0 1 7 1 4 1 . 2 8 1 4 3 7 2 . 9 4 9 1 2 4 3 3 6 4 9 2 1 5 6 8 1 5 9 1 2 
1992 3837.34 4291.08 0 38039.13 26168.3689 46167.55 34296 78893 
1993 13753.97 7338.6 0 113139.6 49209.2857 134232.17 70301 85569 
1994 22632.18 11358.21 0 83537.22 66595.5292 117527.61 100585 9192 
1995 27880.35 14698.01 0 100347.62 72749.7343 142925 98 115328 0943 
1996 32301.41 23134.28 0 243061.21 113248.043 298496 9 168683 733 
1997 57496.94 27578.8 0 443254.5 207740.772 528330 24 292816 5116 
1998 49944.2 37788.44 673.56 324699.07 201915.267 413105.27 289647.9074 
Components of Market Capital for all firms (percent) 
J ： ! Prd Common stock (MV) D/E Ratio 
1992 ^ ~ ~ ^TfT" 
1993 10.246 5.467 0.000 84 287 Q 186 
1 卯 4 1 9 . 2 5 7 9 . 6 6 4 0 . 0 0 0 7 1 . 0 7 9 0 4 0 7 
1995 19.507 10.284 0.000 70.210 0 424 
1996 10.821 7.750 0.000 81.428 Q 228 
1 的7 10.883 5.220 0.000 83.897 Q 192 
棚 1 2 . 0 9 0 9.147 0.163 78.600 0 2 7 0 
1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 8 1 3 . 0 1 7 8 . 1 1 8 0 . 0 2 3 7 8 . 8 4 2 0 . 2 7 5 
Components of Book Capital for ail firms (percent) 
b l Prd Common stock (BV) D/E Ratio* 
1 卯 2 1 1 . 1 8 9 1 2 . 5 1 2 ~ 7 6 ^ 
1993 19.564 10.439 0.000 69.997 0 429 
22.500 11.292 0.000 66.208 Q 510 
24.175 12.745 0.000 63.081 0 585 
1 卯 6 1 9 . 1 4 9 1 3 . 7 1 5 0 . 0 0 0 6 7 . 1 3 6 0 4 9 0 
1997 19.636 9.418 0.000 70.946 0 410 
17.203 13.016 0.232 69.549 0 435 
1992-1998 19.059 11.877 0.033 69 031 0 453 
Components of Market Capital in the Initial Year (percent) 
LT ^ Common Stock (MV) D/E Ratio 
^ ^ ‘ 80.550 , 
1993 13.274 8.281 78.445 0 275 
1994 8.864 22.670 68.466 0 461 
1995 0.237 4.621 95.143 0 051 
1996 1.620 4.909 93.471 0 070 
H Z 2.647 1.689 95.664 0 045 
1992-1997 6.704 8.006 85.290 0.191 
Components of Book Capital in the Initial Year (percent) 
LT ST Common Stock (BV) D/E Ratio* 
顽 ^ ^ ~ ~ ‘ tTJ^   
1993 28.964 18.070 52.966 0 888 
1994 9.781 25.017 65.201 0 534 
1995 0.615 11.990 87.395 0 144 
1996 5.474 16.588 77.938 0 283 
6.828 4.357 88.815 0 126 
11.898 14.090 74.013 0.395 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Two: The Collapse of GITIC 
Date Event  
April 1995 GITIC's~senior~unsecured~dSt~rating~was 
downgraded from Baal to Baa2, reflecting the 
growing commercialization of the economy and the 
increasing tendency for the central government to 
view provincial entities as independent companies 
which should progressively function on commercial 
criteria in the future.  
March 1997 Listing of GITIC Enterprises, GITIC's Hong Kong 
subsidiary, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, an 
incident which violated the relevant listing 
regulations of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission.  
July 1997 Moody chaged the outlook for GITIC's rating from 
stable to negative, reflecting the increased risks that 
result from the gradual distancing of the corporation 
A ^ from its owner, the province of Guangdong.  
Pri Moody assigned first time Financial Strength 
Ratings to seven ITICs it rated in China. GITIC was 
assigned an FSR of E+, the lowest of all the rated 
ITICs, reflecting its substantial exposure to China's 
volatile real estate market, its significant contingent 
liabilities from guarantees it provided to local 
infrastructure projects, poor liquidity and significant 
August 1998 currency risk exposure from its foreign borrowings. 
GITIC's long-term foreign currency debt rating was 
lowered to Bal, its long and short-term foreign 
currency deposit ratings to Ba2 and the financial 
Oct 6 1998 strength rating to E.  
， GITIC was closed down by the People's Bank of 
China, the central bank, and was put under the 
receivership of Bank of China, which was instructed 
by the central bank to administrate the registration 
of GITIC's outstanding debts. According to the 
PBGC's official announcement, during the 
registration period which was reported to extend to 
January 6, 1999, all payment of GITIC's debts will 
Oct 27 1998 be suspended  
• , GITIC failed to make a US$8.78 million coupon 
payment to holders of its 20-year US$200 million 
— Yankee bond. 
December 1998 t^ i ^ ^ ^ — ：~ —— 
Itie Hong Kong Monetary Authority commented 
that banks with exposure to GITIC would have to 
-f in八八 classify as sub-standard loans. January 10,1999 ^ 丨.~ : ：： 
i he liquidation investigation committee, led by the 
Bank of China announced that GITIC and three of 
its principal financial subsidiaries- GITIC 
Shenzhen，GITIC International Leasing and 
Guangxi Enterprises Development would be 
— allowed to file for bankruptcy.  
Appendix Three Some Sydicated Loans of Red Chips Maturing in 1999 
Borrower/Gurantor |Amount (USD MM) Lauch Date| Tenor (year) 
Everbright Group " loo J T ^ " 
China Resources Group 50 Mar 94 5 
China Travel Group 70 Sep. 98 1 
China Merchant Group 16 Feb. 96 3 
China Merchant Group 200 jun. 98 1 
China Merchant Group 50 jui 97 1 
COSOC Group 200 Nov. 98 3 
Guangdong Ent. Group 26 May. 96 3 
Guangdong Ent. Group 150 jun. 94 5 
Guangdong Ent. Group 70 jui. 95 3 
Shanghai Ind. Group 125 jul 97 2 
Shum Yip Group 43 oct 96 3 
Top Glory Group 70 Dec 96 3 
Top Glory Group 42 jul. 96 3 
YueXue Group 65 Apr 98 1 
Yue Xue Group ^ Dec. 96! 3 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Five R e t u r n on Asse t s for non- f inanc ia l red chips (percent ) 
Equity Cod I 199 19971 1996| 1994| 
Beijing Dev(HK) 154 __ -10.66 ~ -4.01 -7.48 8 ul 9.741 ipysl 
Ent 392 4.4 N/A I N/A | N/A I N M I ^ 
CASIL Telecom ^ 1.72 14.33 N/A I N/A I ^ 
China Aerospace 31 -4.68 3.36 4.21 5.43 1 4 丨 " T o i l 
China EB ltd N/A -5.69 0.64丨 6.：3了1 -9 44I ^ 
二 二 ^ _ _ - 7 . 6 3 2 0.21 0 0 2 - 1 . 0 9 “ “ ^ 
China EB Tech 2 5 6 _ -38.69 67.1 0.82丨 -3o| ~ ^ 
China Foods 506 6.04 5.2丨 0.99丨 2.24丨 0 J 
China Mer HIdflS m 7.49 5.49 7.48丨 5.821 T i i T ^ 
China Overseas 688 _ -5.48 6.33 7.99丨 1 0 . 2 2 丨 ^  
Chma Pharma 7-33 9.34 5.53 24.38| N/A I i；；；^ 
China Resources 291 5.94 8.09 4.12 2.55丨 2 92"! V M 
C h m a Res Beijing 1109 4.45 5.37 N/A N/A | N/A I ^ 
China Telecom (Hong Kong) 941 10.66 11.93丨 28.45丨 n"^ !^ ^ ^ 
China Travel H K 308 -2.97 5.85 4.76丨 7.221 ^ ^ 
Chu Kong Ship 5 6 0 _ 11.42 N/A N/A 丨 N/A I 』 ^ 
C m C Pacific Limited 4.11 12.49 15.36丨 / " i i T " ^ ^ 
二 , _ _ 7 . 8 2 7.86 5.45 -7.21 德 
Continental Mar m 3.33 4.9 j.osl 2.67I ^ ~ ^ 
C〇SC〇 infl HIdqs 5 1 7 ^ -23.35 一 0 . 8 8 -11.91 248 2 9 9 ^ 
C〇SC〇 Pacific n ^ 8.67 10.34 9.39 9 38 N/A M / J 
二 y = 、 203__2.28 2.93 -33.78 -634 14.52 1349 
= d e ， 4 1 8 _ 1 1 . 0 2 11.18 N/A N/A N/A 
gITIC ’t ^ _ ： 2 9 ^ 17.23 11.42 N/A 丨 N/A I ~ i U ^ 
Guangdong Brewery 4.42 N/A N/A I N/a1 ^ ^ 
Guangdong Tannery 1058 _ -1.79 6.11 N/A | N/A I ~ ^ ^ 
， a _ 。 n = V ^ _ 2 7 0 _ - 9 . 2 5 3.61 4.07 4 49 6.99 6 68 
Guangnan(Hldqs) 1 2 0 3 ^ -68.64 5.59 6.93 ；.28丨 n"^ ^ , 
= g z h 。 u Inv 123 0.6 2.38 -0.24 4 71 ^ ^ ^ 
二二ansport 1 0 ^ 5.74 6.17 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
382 -5.86 -10.66| -4.84 丨 s . s t ^ 
Sun Fook Kong HIdqs ^ 一 -29.38 2.21 -26.84| Zssi ？  
Tianjmg Deve. Holdings Ltd. ^ 6.11 N/A | N/A I ^ ^ 
Legend ^ 2.17 -3.36 -12.78 N/A N/A N/A 
二 ' N ， 2 2 2 _ _ - 2 . 2 4 6.47 4.74 6 22 9.59I S J 
Ng Fung Honq ^ 一 15.67 20.31 22.98 N/A ^ ^ 
gNF 二 q : gg^ 一 10.04 ？ii 1.64 5 22 5.93 N A 
二t日丨 M 德 1208 -7.43 -6.61 0.04 ai6 ^ ^ 
：广二 ^ _ _ 1 . 2 3 2.48 1.06 24 93 - 1 . d ~： ^ 
二anghai ind HIdqs ^ _ _ 8 . 1 6 10.48 N/A N/A N / T ^ ~ ~ ^ 
S e n y m w a n q u o 2 1 8 _ _ - 9 . 7 5 6.43 2.12 10.88 T i ^ ~ ~ ^ 
_ _ 5 . 1 8 205 28.37 -5.08 
二。_ng Cent 一 -12.89 -0.45 1.96 二/A | N/A 1 " ~ ^ 
^ougang Grand 3.28 5.67 12.92 -18 37 ~ ~ T ^ ^ 
^ _ _ • 0.03 1.42 287 2 0 . ~ ~ ^ 
: 。 - 7 丁ech ^ 2.48 3.43 5.05 3 75 -23.05 -21.44 
二 P n v ^ _ _ 4 . 4 1 7.39 4.32 N/A n J ~ ~ ^ 
Stone Electronic 409 -6 3 2.67 6 761 ^ ^ 
T。PG丨ory 丨nt丨丨 翌 ~ ~ a i 6 1.03 6 ^ ~ ~ ^ 
C h m a National Aviation Co. Ltd 1 1 1 0 _ _ -0.32 一 N/A | N/A I ^ 
F.rst Shanghai Investment 227 一-10.74 ~ 1.72 -2.86 N/A | i s " ^ f d 
•Average J -4.32551 6.1493478| 2.3531707| 4.2757576| 2.38857141 1.7665306] 
N/A: not avai lab le Data Source: Bloomberg 
Appendix Six Return on Common Equity for non-financial red chips (percent) 
Equity cod 199 19971 1996| 19941 199^ 
Beijing Dev(HK) 154, -29.03 _ -9.14 -14.311 13 94I ^ 
E n t 3 9 2 8 . 2 4 N / A N / A | N/A1 ^ ^ 
CASIL Telecom ^ 2.54 30.1 _ 丨 _ 丨 N/aI ^ 
China Aerospace 5 1 _ 迎 8.72 9.78 10.45 5.24丨-116.l l1 
China EB ltd N/A -9.89 O.43I 1 卯 3丨- 1 6 . 5 1 1 n " ^ 
China EB Infl 2 5 7 ^ -12.03 3.13 0.28丨 謹丨 ~ ^ 
Chma EB Tech 256 _ -57.6 N/A N/a| N/a| ^ ^ 
China Foods ^ 7.7 6.23 l.szl s.sfl ^ ^ 
C h m a Mer HIdgs 144 10.94 9.12 13.79丨 彳0.73丨 ^ 
China Overseas 688 -10.1 11.53 14.29丨 孔i| 17.92I  
C h m a Pharma 14.04 19.13 13.38丨 36.96] ^ ^ 
C h m a Resources g g j — 14.06 _ 18.84 9.89丨 4.86丨 4 35! ^ 
C h m a Res Beijing 1109 10.59 12.89 N/a| n /a I N/aI ^ 
C h m a Telecom (Hong Kong) g H 一 13.75" 14.79丨 41.92丨 n"^ ^ 
ChinaTravelHK 308_ -4.8 一 9.06 9.64 16.32 N/A ^ 
Chu Kong Ship — 一 13.53 N/A N/a| n/aI j ^ 
c m c Pacific Limited ^ 6.84 19.22I 21.72I 77571 ^ ^ 
冗 C ， I M ^ _ _ 9 . 6 1 B-15 6.42 -9.77 - 1 3 9 " "： ^ 
Continental Mar m 4.66 7.12 2.01 丨 仏 e l ^ ^ 
= 二 _ 祉 一 7 7 1 -38.06 5 03 4.BS N/A 
C〇SC〇 Pacific 1 1 9 9 _ 16.25 18.42 16.37丨 2〗.65丨 ^ 
『 7 = 、 ?23 9.2 14.71 -120.94 ：14.1 34.99 38.81 
d e ， 4 1 8 _ 翌 — 1 8 . 8 20.98 N/A N/A N/A 
g I T I C 二 D ^ _ 2 6 . 5 4 1 6 . 9 N / A | N / A I ~ ^ 
Guangdong Brewery 124 8.48 N/A N/a| N/Xl ^ ^ 
Guangdong Tannery -3.07 11.23 n/a| N/aI n/aI ^ 
G u _ d o n g Inv 270 一 -28.62 ~ 8.98 8.75丨 11.64丨 l i ^ ^ 
Guangnan(Hldqs) ^ N/A 18.94 26.17! 53.261 ^ M 
U i n v 1 - 5 3 5 . 7 9 - 0 . 6 1 1 1 . 3 6 N / A N / A 
二 a n s p o r t ^ 9.04 7.85 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
^ ^ 382 -23M -40.111 -15.97| 24081 ^ ^ 
， F o o k Kong HIdqs 535 -44.25 3.18 細 丨 4.771 ^ 
Tianjmg Deve. Holdings Ltd. 8.58 N/A N/a| ^ ^ 
1 •严 ; d H i y s ^ _ _ 2 1 . 5 7 - 1 4 . 9 2 - 4 8 . 9 N / A N / A N / A 
二 i n H ， 222 _ _ _ - 2 . 7 8 9.03 7.2 7.92 12.2 8 6 
^ _ _ 3 肩 3 6 . 0 9 3 1 . 5 8 N / A N / A N / A 
， F ， 二 ^ _ _ 翌 n ： ^ ^ 6.64 9.21 9.09 N/A 
〇 门 _ 1 2 0 8 — - 2 2 . 9 5 - 2 5 . 7 8 0 . 1 8 2 6 7 ^ ^ 
P。丨 y l n v _ s g g ^ I i m i i ~ ~ 4 . 2 4 1.81 4 8 - d ~ ~ ^ ~ ^ 
: n g h a i 丨nd H.dps ^ _ _ 1 1 . 5 3 15.17 N/A N/A N ^ ~ ~ ^ 
Shenym W a n g u o 218 一 -22.75 15.41 4.54 2 .65 ^ 
Shenzhen Int'l 152 T : d 7 7 H ^ ― H ^ ^ 
— ； r i — -44.05 4.28 7.43 2.16 43.64 -94.88 
,ougang Cent 1 0 3 ^ . -39.98 -4.09 5 .18 N/A| N / X T I D 
， u g a n g G r a n d 3 . 4 2 6 . 3 4 2 0 . 3 2 - 2 9 . 0 1 ~ ^ ^ 
: 。 二 ^ _ - 2 3 . 8 7 0.11 6.26 1 4 91 d ~ ~ 
: o - n、 q「 e c h ^ 3.79 6.08 11.13 1085 -64.29 -165.87 
^ h 二 P n v . ^ _ _ 1 0 . 4 8 1 9 . 4 1 7 . 3 2 N / A N / A N / A 
， e Electronic 翌 一—11.64 6.89 7.52 18.31 25 ^ 
丁。P Glory infl ^ 1.98 4.94 I.62I 9 9 7 I ——3 
China National Aviation Co. Ltd 1110 -0.33 n/a| n/A丨 n 」 ^ ^ 
First Shanghai Investment 227 -16 2.54 ―横丨 n/aI ~ ^ f d 
•Average -5.942083| 7.71| 2.1195| 12.103636| 3.57285711 - 2 . 5 0 2 ^ 
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